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I. INTRODUCTION
Because they are dependent and vulnerable, young people1 have
long been the recipients of governmental policies and legal measures
aimed at promoting their welfare and protecting them in circum-
stances of perceived need.2  Through its parens patriae power, the
state routinely maintains a paternalistic posture in its interactions
with minors in hopes of assisting their development into mature and
responsible adulthood.3  In similar fashion, governmentally employed
1. In relation to other forms of life, human children are unique, especially among
the primates, in the extent of their vulnerability and dependence on an extended
period of socialization and learning in order to achieve maturity.  David Richards,
The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1980).  Thus, human childhood is a comparatively long
period during which young people generally acquire the competencies of adult-
hood. Id.
2. Some argue, however, that the concept of childhood is a relatively recent social
invention, noting that medieval children were typically absorbed in the working
world of adults at about age seven.  For example, see the summary of the work of
Phillipe Aries in Bruce Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” B.Y.U. L. REV.
605, 613 (1976).  Nevertheless, Hafen questions this view, pointing out that the
common law’s recognition of a longer childhood with the coming of the Renais-
sance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution actually constituted a
rediscovery of traditional notions of childhood found in ancient Greek and Roman
cultures. Id. at 613–14.  For John Stewart Mill, the perception of vulnerability
and dependence required the law to protect children “against their own actions as
well as against external injury.”  JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13–14
(Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859).
3. Through the concept of parens patriae (the state as a parent), English courts of
equity could declare a child a ward of the Crown when parents or guardians
failed to adequately provide for the child’s welfare.  SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES 1–2 (2d ed. 1996).  The parens patriae principle has been extended in
recent times to support a host of state mechanisms aimed at protecting children
in need. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 335 (2d ed. 1988). But see Douglass R. Rendleman, Parens Pa-
triae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 210–12 (1971) (ques-
tioning whether the early Chancery notion of parens patriae explains the origin of
state intervention for the protection of minors).
When the protection of children is not adequately provided by private parties
charged with their protection, the state intervenes, sometimes by helping parents
or guardians to care for the child, sometimes by modifying the custodial situation
of the child, and sometimes by imposing penalties for failure to provide the re-
quired protection of the child. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal.
App. 1979) (“[U]nder the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has the right, in-
deed the duty, to protect children.”).  Moreover, the parens patriae concept pro-
vides the philosophical basis for the juvenile justice system, enacted to provide a
non-punitive alternative to the criminal law in dealing with youthful offenders.
See, e.g., Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legis-
lative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471,
476 (1987); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966) (indicat-
ing that in juvenile courts “the state is parens patriae rather than prosecuting
attorney and judge”).
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educators are often loosely deemed to act in loco parentis and thus are
sometimes thought to assume a quasi-parental relationship with their
students.4  Juveniles are thus the recipients of unique legal attention
in a variety of ways.  Such attention has, of course, generated a host of
judicial controversies.5
A particularly troublesome issue concerns the extent to which en-
acted rules thought to be addressed specifically to young people are
unconstitutionally vague.  Such rules appear in two separate and dis-
tinct contexts: (1) enactments defining status offense jurisdiction of
juvenile courts, and (2) measures intended to maintain discipline in
schools.6
In this Article, I clarify the vagueness problems in the contexts of
status offense jurisdiction and school discipline by appealing to the
distinction between “conduct rules,” which are addressed to the gen-
eral public, and “decision rules,” which are addressed to official deci-
sionmakers.  This distinction, as others have argued recently in other
contexts,7 illuminates these particular vagueness problems in the law.
Much of the controversy and confusion in the case law results from
courts assuming that status offense statutes and school disciplinary
rules operate as conduct rules aimed at notifying young people—po-
tential status offenders and students, respectively—of conduct to be
4. Until recently, some courts literally saw educators as standing in loco parentis to
their students.  Thus the teacher was deemed, like the parent, a private person
whose actions toward the student raised no state action and thus no possible con-
stitutional claim. See, e.g., D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 256 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (indicating the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when a teacher
searches her student at school); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).  In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Supreme Court
viewed such reasoning as “in tension” with the realities of modern compulsory
education laws and earlier Supreme Court cases granting students certain consti-
tutional rights in the school setting. Id. at 336.  Thus for the Court it was “diffi-
cult to understand why [educators] should be deemed to be exercising parental
rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students.” Id.
The Court went on to hold that when conducting searches and other disciplinary
functions school officials act as “representatives of the State, not merely as surro-
gates for the parents,” and thus they “cannot claim the parents’ immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 336–37.
While such language would seem to totally reject the in loco parentis doctrine,
the Court in a later case seemed to give at least limited approval to the doctrine.
“[W]e have acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities [a]ct in loco
parentis.’ ” Veronia Sch. Dist. 477 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)); see infra Part V.
5. See generally MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW (3d ed. 2009).
6. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
7. Several commentators have focused on the conduct rule/decision rule distinction
in clarifying problems in the criminal law. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625 (1984); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudica-
tion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990).
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avoided, when, in fact, the rules constitute decision rules aimed at
guiding the exercise of discretion of juvenile court functionaries and
educational officials.  Appreciation of the conduct rule/decision rule
distinction will provide the courts with a vital analytical tool in decid-
ing future vagueness claims, as well as afford policymakers guidance
in fashioning status offense legislation and school discipline rules.
Part II of the Article discusses the conduct rule/decision rule dis-
tinction and its relevance to vagueness problems.  Part III discusses
relevant status offense cases raising the vagueness issue, rethinks
them in terms of the distinction, and offers an assessment of when
decision rules alone are constitutionally permissible.  Part IV offers a
similar case analysis relating the conduct rule/decision rule distinc-
tion to the context of vagueness attacks on student disciplinary rules.
II. CONDUCT RULES, DECISION RULES, AND THE
DOCTRINE OF VAGUENESS
Professor Meir Dan-Cohen observed that it “is an old but neglected
idea” that a distinction can be drawn in the law between rules ad-
dressed to the general public, “conduct rules,” and rules addressed to
officials, “decision rules.”8  The distinction was recognized in Talmudic
law9 and reintroduced in modern times by Bentham.10  While Ben-
tham, Dan-Cohen, and others11 have employed the distinction to illu-
minate problems in the criminal law, it is also useful in clarifying a
variety of problems elsewhere,12 particularly claims of vagueness re-
garding status offense statutes and school disciplinary rules.  As I will
show, decision rules are often by their nature purposely and permissi-
bly vague.  Conduct rules, by contrast, constitutionally require, at
least in the criminal context, greater clarity and certainty.
A. Explaining the Distinction
Scholarly discussion of the conduct rule/decision rule distinction
often focuses on the relationship between rules defining criminal of-
fenses and those prescribing punishment for those offenses.13  The for-
8. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 625.
9. See, e.g., DAVID DAUBE, FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION 24 (1956), cited in Dan-
Cohen, supra note 7, at 626 n.1.
10. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 626; see infra note 13.
11. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 7.
12. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 14–63 (1987) (dis-
cussing issues in contracts, torts, property, and welfare rights law in terms of the
distinction between “rules” and “standards,” which is in many ways analogous to
the conduct rule/decision rule distinction).
13. The classic statement comes from Bentham:
A law confining itself to the creation of an offence, and a law command-
ing a punishment to be administered in case of the commission of such
an offence, are two distinct laws; not parts (as they seem to have been
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mer operate to communicate to the public what they can, must, and
must not do under threat of criminal sanction.  Indeed, conduct rules
are constitutionally necessary preconditions for the imposition of pun-
ishment.14  On the other hand, decision rules function as the means
for adjudicating whether offenses have occurred and, if so, administer-
ing legal consequences.15  The two kinds of rules have different doctri-
nal foundations.  Conduct rules provide notice to the public of activity
subject to sanction; decision rules guide decisionmakers such as police,
prosecutors, juries, and judges in assessing the blameworthiness of,
and imposing sanctions against, conduct rule violators.16
By their nature, conduct rules, whether in the criminal context or
elsewhere, should be understandable to the general community and
provide sufficient clarity to provide notice of the scope of the law so
generally accounted hitherto) of one and the same law.  The acts they
command are altogether different; the persons they are addressed to are
altogether different.  Instance, Let no man steal; and, Let the judge cause
whoever is convicted of stealing to be hanged.
JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (W. Harrison ed., 1948), quoted in
Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 626.
While Bentham observes that rules defining offenses (conduct rules) and
those directing judges to administer punishment (decision rules) are distinct, the
two kinds of rules are closely related.  He noted that
though a simply imperative law, and the punitory law attached to it, are
so far distinct laws, that the former contains nothing of the latter, and
the latter, in its direct tenor, contains nothing of the former; yet by im-
plication, and that a necessary one, the punitory does involve and in-
clude the import of the simply imperative law to which it is appended.
To say to the judge, Cause to be hanged whoever in due form of law is
convicted of stealing, is, though not a direct, yet as intelligible a way of
intimating to men in general that they must not steal, as to say to them
directly, Do not steal: and one sees, how much more likely to be
efficacious.
Id.
For a discussion of a variety of problems in the criminal law in terms of the
conduct rule/decision rule distinction, see generally Robinson, supra note 7. See
also KELMAN, supra note 12, at 25–32 (utilizing the distinction between “rules”
and “standards” in discussing problems in criminal law); George Fletcher, Rights
and Excuses, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 19, 23 (1984) (providing that rules defining
excuses are not aimed at notifying citizens but are instead meant to govern evalu-
ative decisions of courts).
14. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (finding punishment con-
stitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment only for “acts” and not mere “status” conditions).  I have recently
argued that the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment provides
the proper constitutional ground for Robinson. See Martin R. Gardner, Rethink-
ing Robinson v. California in the Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding the “De-
mise of the Criminal Law” by Attending to “Punishment,” 98 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2008).
15. Robinson, supra note 7, at 731.
16. Id.
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that members of the public can avoid committing criminal offenses.17
Thus it is essential that conduct rules be simple, brief, and grounded
in objective criteria in order to avoid unpredictability, vagueness, and
ambiguity.18  The primary rationale of conduct rules is notice.19
Decision rules, on the other hand, are addressed to officials em-
powered and often trained in making judgments.  They are routinely
broad and open-ended, allowing the decisionmaker to take into ac-
count the complex and varied situational factors of a particular case.
Such rules embrace subjective criteria inviting individualized discre-
tion and normative assessments.20  Because decision rules are rou-
tinely applied only after thoughtful consideration, there is less need
for clarity than with conduct rules.21  Indeed, given the multiplicity of
factors relevant to making wise decisions in any given case, relative
vagueness in decision rules is a virtue, in order to properly permit
evaluations without the constraints imposed by conduct rules.22  In-
stead of providing notice—the primary rationale of conduct rules—de-
cision rules are aimed primarily at defining areas where the exercise
of official discretion and protecting against its abuse is appropriate in
deciding legal cases.23
17. See KELMAN, supra note 12, at 14–63; Robinson, supra note 7, at 770.
18. Robinson, supra note 7, at 758–59.
19. Id. at 770.  The requirement of clear notice of prohibited conduct is a central as-
pect of the “Rule of Law” or the “Principle of Legality,” a basic tenet of criminal
law theory. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 157 (1978)
(“The premise underlying objectivist theory is a general proposition about the
nature of legal liability, particularly criminal liability.  The proposition is that no
liability should attach unless . . . the defendant’s conduct objectively conforms to
criteria specified in advance.”); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 25, 28 (2d ed. 1960) (“The principle of legality is in some ways the most
fundamental of all the principles . . .  [T]he principle means that no conduct may
be held criminal unless it is precisely described in a penal law.”); HERBERT
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 80 (1968) (“The principle [of le-
gality] may be essentially sound, and the all-but-universal compliance with it
that characterizes the administration of the criminal law in this country . . . may
be the loftiest of tributes to the civilized state we have achieved.”). But see John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 205–12 (1985) (identifying the notice requirement in terms of
“lawyers notice” rather than the necessity of particular defendants actually hav-
ing prior notice of conduct rules).
20. Robinson, supra note 7, at 732.
21. Id. at 759.
22. Id.  Mark Kelman observes that “all actors in our system are deeply committed to
a jurisprudence of informal standards, of highly general policy commands, per-
mitting ad hoc situation-sensitive decisions in particular cases with little prece-
dential value.” KELMAN, supra note 12, at 15.  Paradoxically, at the same time he
notes that we also favor constraining decisionmakers’ discretion by the use of
clear rules. Id; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 639–40 (discussing judicial
toleration of the “vague and open-ended quality of the defenses of duress and
necessity”).
23. Robinson, supra note 7, at 770; Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 650.
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As illustrated above, conduct rules and decision rules sometimes
co-exist in a given legal context.24  However, any given rule may be a
conduct rule, a decision rule, or both.25  Therefore, decision rules will
sometimes be the sole basis for resolving a legal controversy as, for
example, in situations where legal functionaries are empowered to
make decisions “in the best interests” of a child when deciding child
custody disputes.26
As will be shown throughout this Article, the conduct rule/decision
rule distinction provides a useful analytical tool in deciding questions
of unconstitutional vagueness of legal rules, particularly those con-
cerning status offense jurisdiction and school discipline regulation.
Before illustrating this usefulness, however, attention must be di-
rected to the void for vagueness doctrine itself.
B. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
Courts have traditionally refused to enforce rules deemed too un-
certain to be applied,27 particularly rules invoking the criminal sanc-
tion.28  Although a variety of early doctrinal grounds were employed
24. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
25. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 631.
26. JOHN DE WITT GREGORY et al., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 371 (2d ed. 1995).
27. See generally, Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH.
L. REV. 831 (1928).
28. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  The cases of unconstitutional
vagueness routinely are criminal in nature.  See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507 (1948) (declaring statute imposing criminal penalties for prohibiting dis-
tribution of magazines depicting deeds of “bloodshed or lust” so “massed as to
become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes” void); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (declaring void a statute making it a crime to be a
“gangster”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (declaring void a
statute imposing requirement to pay “not less than current rate of per diem
wages in the locality” on penalty of fine or imprisonment); see also infra notes
46–60 and accompanying text.
The Court on occasion has considered vagueness cases outside the criminal
law. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (upholding
on vagueness and overbreadth grounds a challenge by faculty members to a state
statute requiring them to sign, on penalty of dismissal, a statement that they
were not Communists nor engaged in “seditious” activities). Keyishian also
raised issues of statutory overbreadth in chilling First Amendment rights of Free
Speech.  Separate from due process vagueness, see infra note 30 and accompany-
ing text, the overbreadth doctrine is peculiar to the First Amendment. NORMAN
REDLICH et al., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 371 (2d ed. 1999).  One
commentator has observed that “[o]utside of the criminal and First Amendment
contexts, courts virtually never find a statute to be unconstitutionally vague.”
Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpre-
tive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1309–10 (2000); see infra note 36 and accompa-
nying text.
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for such refusal,29 the Supreme Court presently has settled on the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the foun-
dation for the void for vagueness doctrine.30  The constitutional con-
cern centers on whether the “words and phrases [of a statute or
regulation] are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for
their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law.”31
A fundamental objection to vague rules is that they fail to notify
persons potentially subject to their sanction.  Where the sanction is
punitive, the ancient maxim “nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege”32 has long embodied a fair warning requirement as a pre-
condition for punishment.33  Thus statutes are unconstitutional if
“men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] mean-
ing and differ as to [their] application.”34  While the vagueness doc-
trine nominally applies to civil cases,35 it is almost always raised in
attacks on criminal statutes, since the threat of punishment has tradi-
tionally triggered a vagueness inquiry.36
The Court’s reference “to men of common intelligence” might sug-
gest that the fair warning inquiry is addressed to whether a particular
defendant in a particular case was adequately warned.  It is settled,
however, that the proper inquiry is addressed to whether a hypotheti-
cal ordinary person familiar with the statute and its official interpre-
tations would have fair warning.37  Such a view has led some to
conclude that all that is required is a form of “lawyers notice,”38 the
29. Early cases struck down vague statutes on separation of powers grounds (Con-
gress in enacting ambiguous statutes could not pass on its law-making job to the
judiciary) and Sixth Amendment grounds (accused persons have right to be in-
formed of the “nature and cause of the accusation”). WAYNE E. LA FAVE, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 103 (4th ed. 2003).  For an examination of the historical origins of the
vagueness doctrine, see Bell, supra note 28, at 1285 n.123.
30. LA FAVE, supra note 29, at 103.
31. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932).
32. The maxim is roughly translated as “no crime without law nor punishment with-
out law.” PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 74 (1997); see supra note 19.
33. See supra note 19.
34. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
35. See supra note 28.
36. See Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry Into Vagueness, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1543, 1553–56 (1981).  The Supreme Court has specifically demanded a
higher degree of certainty where punishment is imposed for a rule violation.
“The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is [sic] higher than
in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.”  Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
37. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355 n.5 (1964) (“The determina-
tion whether a criminal statute provides fair warning of its prohibitions must be
made on the basis of the statute itself and the other pertinent law, rather than on
the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations of particular de-
fendants.”); see also Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal
Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4–5 (1997).
38. Jeffries, supra note 19, at 211.
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kind of notice an ordinary person would receive if he sought a legal
opinion of a statute’s meaning in deciding whether the statute applied
to him.39
In addition to the fair warning rationale underlying the vagueness
doctrine, vague rules also create two other problems: (1) vague rules
potentially encourage arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement
and (2) they risk chilling constitutionally protected activity,40 particu-
larly free speech interests protected by the First Amendment.41
In the context of the conduct rule/decision rule distinction, the fair
warning rationale applies exclusively to conduct rules addressed to
the public,42 while the arbitrary/discriminatory enforcement rationale
applies exclusively to decision rules.43  The chilling effect rationale
would seem to speak both to conduct rules, protecting the public from
being discouraged from engaging in permissible or even desirable ac-
tivity,44 and to decision rules, inviting official definitions of protected
activity.45
These points are illustrated by the Supreme Court’s opinion in City
of Chicago v. Morales,46 a case invalidating a city ordinance that pro-
hibited loitering by gang members with other persons.  Commission of
39. LA FAVE, supra note 29, at 103–05.
40. See infra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. See generally, Anthony Amster-
dam, Note, The Void-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960).
41. See, e.g., LA FAVE, supra note 29, at 108–09; REDLICH ET AL., supra note 28, at
380–81 (“In free speech cases, overbreadth and vagueness challenges are often
asserted together even though overbreadth is a First Amendment challenge and
vagueness is a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge, not con-
fined to speech cases.”); Jeffries, supra note 19, at 216–17; Amsterdam, supra
note 40, at 75–85.
42. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 661.
43. Id.
44. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the Court struck
down on vagueness grounds a statute prohibiting, among other things, “wander-
ing or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object.”
Id. at 157 n.1.  In worrying that the statute might deter normal, everyday con-
duct, the Court said:
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the ameni-
ties of life as we have known them.  They are not mentioned in the Con-
stitution or in the Bill of Rights.  These unwritten amenities have been
in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.  These amenities have dignified
the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and
the right to defy submissiveness.  They have encouraged lives of high
spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
Id. at 164.
45. In addition to determining the scope of constitutionally protected rights, “courts
may also consider the chilling effect on subconstitutional rights in deciding
whether ambiguous statutory language is tolerable under the vagueness doc-
trine.”  Batey, supra note 37, at 18; see supra note 44.
46. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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the offense required that a police officer reasonably believe that at
least one of the two or more persons present in a “public place” was a
“criminal street gang member”47 who was “loitering,” defined by the
ordinance as “remaining in any one place with no apparent pur-
pose.”48  The officer was then required to order “all” the persons to
remove themselves “from the area.”49  Failure of any such person to
honor the officer’s request constituted violation of the ordinance.
A plurality of the Court invalidated the ordinance on vagueness
grounds, finding that it provided inadequate notice to citizens, ad-
versely impacted protected liberty interests, and afforded too much
discretion to the police, thus inviting arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement.50
The plurality found that the ordinance, which it characterized as a
“criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement,”51 provided in-
sufficient warning, leaving “the public uncertain as to the conduct it
prohibits.”52  Citizens standing in a public place with a group of people
would have no way of knowing whether or not they had an “apparent
purpose.”53  That the ordinance was not violated until the perceived
loiterer refused the police officer’s dispersal order did not solve the
vagueness problems for the plurality because “[i]f the loitering [was]
in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself [would be] an
unjustified impairment of liberty.”54  Because an officer could issue
the dispersal order only after the “loitering”55 had already occurred,
the order could not “provide the kind of advance notice that will pro-
tect the putative loiterer from being ordered to disperse.  Such an or-
der cannot retroactively give adequate warning of the boundary
between the permissible and the impermissible applications of the
law.”56
Perhaps even more problematic for the Morales plurality was the
degree of discretion the ordinance granted police to determine
whether one remained in any place “with no apparent purpose.”  The
47. The ordinance defined a “criminal street gang” as “any ongoing organization, as-
sociation in fact or group of three or more persons . . . having as one or more of its
activities the commission of . . . criminal acts.” Id. at 47 n.2.
48. Id.
49. After initial passage of the ordinance, the Chicago Police Department promul-
gated an internal regulation aimed at structuring the exercise of enforcement
discretion.  Only certain designated officers trained in gang affairs could arrest
and then only in areas of the City identified as having gang problems. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 60–63.  Protected liberty interests including “the right to move from one
place to another according to inclination.” Id. at 53.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 56 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966)).
53. Id. at 56–57.
54. Id. at 58.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 59.
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plurality saw the ordinance as “inherently subjective” because its ap-
plication depends on whether some “purpose” is “apparent” to the of-
ficer on the scene.57
The plurality thus saw both the “loitering” and the order to dis-
perse components of the ordinance as conduct rules which failed to
sufficiently warn the public.  The ordinance also constituted a decision
rule, which inadequately limited the discretion of relevant govern-
mental officials.  In the eyes of the plurality, the City had enacted an
ordinance that “affords too much discretion to the police and too little
notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets.”58
Justice Scalia, in dissent, found no constitutional infirmity with
the ordinance.  Upon examination, the basis for his disagreement with
the plurality can be understood in terms of his interpretation of the
conduct rule/decision rule distinction, which differed from that of the
plurality.
For Scalia, the part of the ordinance referring to loitering was a
decision rule addressed to the police and not to the citizen.  “The only
part of the ordinance that refers to loitering is the portion that ad-
dresses, not the punishable conduct of the defendant, but what the
police officer must observe before he can issue an order to disperse.”59
Moreover, the decision rule, “what the police officer must observe,”
was “carefully defined in terms of what the defendant appears to be
doing, not in terms of what the defendant is actually doing.”60
57. Id. at 62.  The plurality observed, “Presumably an officer would have discretion to
treat some purposes—perhaps a purpose to engage in idle conversation or simply
to enjoy a cool breeze on a warm evening—as too frivolous to be apparent if he
suspected a different ulterior motive.”  Moreover, because the ordinance “applies
to everyone in the city who may remain in one place with one suspected gang
member as long as their purpose is not apparent to an officer observing them,”
therefore “[f]riends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers might
unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle conver-
sation with a gang member.” Id. at 62–63.
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id. at 89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id.  Scalia explained:
The ordinance does not require that the defendant have been loitering
(i.e., have been remaining in one place with no purpose), but rather that
the police officer have observed him remaining in one place without any
apparent purpose.  Someone who in fact has a genuine purpose for re-
maining where he is (waiting for a friend, for example, or waiting to hold
up a bank) can be ordered to move on (assuming the other conditions of
the ordinance are met), so long as his remaining has no apparent pur-
pose.  It is likely, to be sure, that the ordinance will come down most
heavily upon those who are actually loitering (those who really have no
purpose in remaining where they are); but that activity is not a condition
for issuance of the dispersal order.
Id.
For Scalia, the decision rule “could hardly be clearer.” Id. at 92.  The police
must have “probable cause” to believe that one of a group to which the order is to
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The only conduct rule entailed in the ordinance was, for Scalia, the
prohibition against disobeying the officer’s request to disperse.61
Thus understood, the conduct rule clearly defines the prohibited act
and also supplies a mens rea component.62
Finally, the fact that the officer’s order to disperse may reach a
substantial amount of innocent conduct is constitutionally irrelevant,
because, for Scalia, the conduct was not constitutionally protected.  It
was thus up to the citizens of Chicago and not for the Court to decide
whether it is worth trading the loss of some innocent conduct for the
value of reducing the evils of gang-related activity.63
This is not to argue that utilization of the conduct rule/decision
rule distinction solves the vagueness problems posed in Morales.
Rather, the point is simply that sensitivity to the distinction may
be issued is a “criminal street gang member” substantiated by the officer’s “expe-
rience and knowledge of the alleged offenders” and supported by “reliable infor-
mation.” Id.  Moreover, while the “remaining in one place with no apparent
purpose” requirement may be somewhat ambiguous “at the margin,” it is “clear in
most of its applications.” Id. The provision does not apply to mere “standing” but
to “remaining,” a term “obviously mean[ing] ‘to endure or persist.’ ” Id. at 92–93
(quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1525 (1992)).
61. Id. at 89.
62. Id.  Scalia explained:
The only act of a defendant that is made punishable by the ordinance—
or, indeed, that is even mentioned by the ordinance—is his failure to
“promptly obey” an order to disperse.  The question, then, is whether
that actus reus must be accompanied by any wrongful intent—and of
course it must.  As the Court itself describes the requirement, “a person
must disobey the officer’s order.”  No one thinks a defendant could be
successfully prosecuted under the ordinance if he did not hear the order
to disperse, or if he suffered a paralysis that rendered his compliance
impossible.  The willful failure to obey a police order is wrongful intent
enough.
Id.
63. Id. at 94.  The ordinance was enacted to deal with a well-documented gang prob-
lem in Chicago. Id. at 46 (majority opinion).  On the trade-off involved, Scalia
observed:
But in our democratic system, how much harmless conduct to proscribe
is not a judgment to be made by the courts.  So long as constitutionally
guaranteed rights are not affected, and so long as the proscription has a
rational basis, all sorts of perfectly harmless activity by millions of per-
fectly innocent people can be forbidden—riding a motorcycle without a
safety helmet, for example, starting a campfire in a national forest, or
selling a safe and effective drug not yet approved by the Food and Drug
Administration.  All of these acts are entirely innocent and harmless in
themselves, but because of the risk of harm that they entail, the freedom
to engage in them has been abridged.  The citizens of Chicago have de-
cided that depriving themselves of the freedom to “hang out” with a gang
member is necessary to eliminate pervasive gang crime and intimida-
tion—and that the elimination of the one is worth the deprivation of the
other.  This Court has no business second-guessing either the degree of
necessity or the fairness of the trade.
Id. at 97–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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greatly simplify the analysis64—an adroit application of Occam’s Ra-
zor.  If the loitering component is indeed merely a decision rule and
not also a conduct rule, the fair warning concern essentially drops out
of the case.  The order to disperse thus becomes the only conduct com-
ponent.  There is nothing unclear about such an order.  Without the
corresponding conduct rule, the case is thus reduced to the single is-
sue of the decision rule’s vagueness.65  The rule may, of course, still be
vague if it unduly encourages arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement.
Before leaving Morales, it is worth noting that many have observed
that the Supreme Court’s vagueness cases are probably best under-
stood as primarily grounded in limiting the evils of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory law enforcement, particularly against racial minorities,
rather than in assuring fair warning and protecting against chilling
64. As Professor Dan-Cohen has observed, “Vagueness . . . must be examined with
reference to the relevant audience.  We cannot simply inquire whether a statute
is vague, but instead we must always ask: vague for whom?”  Dan-Cohen, supra
note 7, at 661.
65. The distinction between conduct rules and decision rules may appear obvious on
its face and useful in sorting out issues of alleged unconstitutional vagueness.  It
is surprising, however, how often judicial failure to appreciate the distinction ob-
fuscates sound analysis in vagueness cases.  For example, in Pennsylvania v.
Howe, 842 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) a defendant convicted of various sexual
offenses received an enhanced sentence under a statute imposing such upon “sex-
ual violent predators” suffering from a “personality disorder” or “mental abnor-
mality” in situations where predators are “likely to engage” in future offense. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9792, 9795.1, 9795.4 (2004).  The defendant argued that
the quoted terms were unconstitutionally vague. Howe, 842 A.2d at 443.  The
terms are clearly aspects of a decision rule similar to the terms “mental illness”
and “in the best interests of the individual” identified in Stamus v. Leonhardt,
414 F. Supp. 439, 451–52 (S.D. Iowa 1976), as status conditions to be determined
by those deciding whether individuals should be civilly committed and not as at-
tempts to advise individuals of conduct triggering involuntary civil commitment.
Nevertheless, the Howe court saw the language of the sexual predator statute as
a conduct rule, and consequently assessed it in terms of whether the language
was sufficiently definite “that ordinary people can understand what conduct [the
language] prohibit[s]” and whether the language was not so vague that “men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at [its] meaning and differ as to [its]
application.”  842 A.2d at 444.  See also E.H. v. State, 443 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984), which considered a vagueness attack on a statue that found
child neglect “when a parent . . . permits a child to live in an environment when
such . . . environment causes the child’s . . . mental or emotional health . . . to be
in danger of being significantly impaired.” FLA. STAT. § 39.01(26) (1981).  While
the statute could easily be read as a decision rule, the court saw the statute as
aimed at notifying parents of “the type of activity they must avoid” to preclude a
finding of neglect.  The court concluded that the statute provided sufficient no-
tice. E.H. v. State, 443 So. 2d at 1084.  A later court engaged in the same analysis
of the same statute and reached the same conclusion. See In re D.M., 616 So. 2d.
1192, 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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the exercise of protected rights.66  Given the nature of urban street
gangs, perhaps the Morales Court was particularly sensitive to the
possible discriminatory application of the Chicago ordinance against
racial minorities.
C. The Virtue of Vague Decision Rules: State Efforts in
Promoting the Welfare of Young People
As shown above, vagueness problems with decision rules are con-
cerned with controlling governmental power.67  Clear rules are a
means of fettering discretion.  Such rules, however, sometimes limit
desirable discretion since the use of nondiscretionary decisionmaking
procedures will inevitably lead to results the policymaker did not in-
tend.68  Specific rules, as opposed to open-ended standards, are often
under-inclusive because they may not cover situations or people the
rule is intended to address.69  At the same time, such rules are also
often over-inclusive because they cover situations or people that do not
pose the harm that the rule was intended to address.70  These
problems are arguably resolved by utilizing vague standards embod-
ied in decision rules that allow the exercise of discretion on a case-by-
case basis. This poses a risk, of course, of that discretion being abused.
Thus, an ongoing scholarly debate rages regarding the relative merits
of specific rules and vague standards.71
As noted above, the Supreme Court’s vagueness doctrine opinions
almost always involve criminal cases.72  The sensitivity to the need for
clear rules in this context led one commentator to see a “hyper privi-
66. See, e.g., Batey, supra note 37, at 5–8; Jeffries, supra note 19, at 212–18.  The
Supreme Court has itself recognized as much: “Although the [vagueness] doctrine
focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have rec-
ognized recently that the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine is not ac-
tual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”  Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
574 (1974)).
67. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 661.
68. KELMAN, supra note 12, at 15.  Professor Kelman explains:
The point is familiar to anyone who has been through a semester of law
school and can even be illustrated to a nonlawyer quite readily.  For ex-
ample, if the purpose of establishing a voting age is to screen out imma-
ture or imprudent voters, directing the voting registrar to allow only
those older than eighteen to vote will screen out some who are mature
and entitle some who are immature, but at the same time it will reduce
occasions for the registrar to exercise arbitrary power and discretion.
Id.
69. Bell, supra note 28, at 17.
70. Id. at 17–18.
71. Id. at 18; see also KELMAN, supra note 12, at 15–63 (weighing “whether to cope
with [an] issue by imprecise rule or by imperfectly administrable standard”).
72. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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leged status of rules in the criminal area.”73  Open-ended standards
are thus most often deemed appropriate in contexts outside the crimi-
nal law.
Even those favoring specific rules usually recognize that open-en-
ded standards are sometimes necessary in situations where the law is
unable to make exact pronouncements due to the difficulty of framing
general rules for all contingencies.74  State attempts to promote the
welfare of children manifest such a situation.  Whether through exer-
cise of its parens patriae power75 or through its endeavors to educate
young people,76 the law embraces a variety of open-ended standards—
such as “the best interests of the child,”77 “substantial change of cir-
cumstances,”78 and being an “unfit parent.”79
Open-ended decision rules are particularly appropriate in situa-
tions where courts and other decisionmakers are required to assess
status conditions of individuals, characterized by Lon Fuller as a “per-
son-oriented” evaluation of the “whole person viewed as a social be-
ing.”80  Such determinations involve no necessary attention to
73. KELMAN, supra note 12, at 26.  Given the severity of the punitive sanction, “the
costs of vagueness are so high in the criminal area that rules ought generally be
preferred” to standards. Id. at 31.
74. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176,
1182 (1989).
75. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 225–77 and accompanying text.
77. Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Conn. 1980) (noting the legislature
acted wisely in embracing the “best interests of the child” standard, thus leaving
the delicate and difficult process of fact-finding in family matters to flexible, indi-
vidualized adjudication of the particular facts of each case without the constraint
of objective guidelines, and accordingly finding the standard is not unconstitu-
tionally vague).  The court in In the Matter of Petition for Adoption of J.S.R., 374
A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977), noted that the “best interest of the child standard” had
become “well engrained” in the law in a variety of contexts.  “Given the multitude
of varied factual situations which must be embraced by such a standard, it must
of necessity contain certain impression and elasticity.” Id.  The court added:
We think it is plain that the standard “best interest of the child” requires
the judge, recognizing human frailty and man’s limitations with respect
to forecasting the future course of human events, to make an informed
and rational judgment, free of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental
of the available alternatives.  No more precision appears possible.  In
this context, no more is constitutionally required.
Id.
78. McLane v. Paul, 189 P.3d 1039, 1041 (Alaska 2008) (“substantial change in cir-
cumstances,” a necessary condition for modifying a child custody judgment).
79. A HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW TERMS 584 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 2001) (noting that
designation as an “unfit parent” is often a basis for disqualifying a parent in child
custody determinations); see Henry Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, Child Cus-
tody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 427–35 (1964).
80. Lon Fuller, Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context 8 (unpublished mate-
rial, item 3 of unbound class material for Sociology of Law, Summer 1971, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley), cited in Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody
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conduct, are not “act-oriented” determinations,81 and thus do not in-
volve conduct rules.  Moreover, person-oriented assessments often re-
quire the decisionmaker to make predictions, such as deciding
whether an individual is mentally ill and poses an on-going danger.82
Person-oriented decision rules are by their nature ad hoc.  Results
in earlier cases involving different people have little relevance to a
subsequent case requiring individualized evaluations of a particular
party.83  Thus the scope of appellate review of person-oriented deci-
sion rules is extremely limited.84  As a consequence, decisions in such
cases are routinely upheld, absent clear abuse of discretion by the
decisionmaker or consideration of an inappropriate factor in making
that decision.85
Person-oriented decision rules apply to young people in a variety of
contexts.86  As will be shown in Part III, understanding the role of
such rules essentially solves the vagueness problems that arise in a
significant subset of status offense statutes.
D. Summary
Before turning to vagueness problems raised by status offense stat-
utes and school disciplinary rules, it is helpful to summarize the key
concepts identified in this section: conduct rules concern only issues of
fair warning and are constitutionally required if punishment is to be
imposed.87  As compared to decision rules, conduct rules require
greater clarity.88  Any given rule may be a conduct rule, a decision
rule, or both.89  Sometimes decision rules alone apply in a particular
legal context.90  Decision rules are often purposely vague, a perceived
virtue especially in the person-oriented context, and are almost al-
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 226, 250–51 (1975).
81. Mnookin, supra note 80, at 250–51.  In making such determinations, as for exam-
ple in deciding the “best interest of the child” in a custody dispute, the court must
evaluate the attitudes, dispositions, capacities and shortcomings of both parents
to apply the best-interest standard.  Mnookin, supra note 80.  The inquiry essen-
tially consists of determining what kind of person each parent is, and what the
child is like. Id.  For a view that the “best interests” standard allows unfettered
discretion and is thus “unjust,” see Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeter-
minable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary
Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 462 (2005).
82. Mnookin, supra note 80, at 252; see also supra note 63 (summarizing several
cases involving rules which contained forward-looking decision elements).
83. Mnookin, supra note 80, at 253.
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., supra note 81.
87. See supra notes 14, 16, and 42 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 17–19 and 21 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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ways constitutional.91  The void for vagueness doctrine is aimed at as-
suring that conduct rules (almost always criminal in nature) provide
fair warning92 and also at assuring that decision rules (again almost
always in criminal cases) do not permit arbitrary or discriminatory
law enforcement or inhibit the exercise of protected activity.93  Fi-
nally, decision rule concerns have come to take priority over conduct
rule concerns in the Supreme Court’s vagueness cases.94
III. VAGUENESS AND DECISION RULES
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
In order to understand the vagueness doctrine as it relates to sta-
tus offense statutes, some background of the juvenile court movement
is necessary.  In particular, appreciation of the distinction between
“delinquency” and “status offense” jurisdiction, as well as an under-
standing of the Supreme Court’s juvenile law cases, needs to be kept
in mind.  The following brief sketch provides such background.
A. The Juvenile Court Movement and Supreme Court
Oversight
Until the late nineteenth century, juveniles who committed crimes
were dealt with through the same criminal justice system applicable
to adult offenders.95  However, because young people were deemed
more malleable and less culpable than their adult counterparts,
policymakers became uneasy with subjecting juvenile offenders to the
ordinary punitive sanctions imposed by the criminal law.96  As a re-
sult—beginning in 1899 in the Illinois legislature and quickly spread-
ing throughout all the United States and much of Europe—the
juvenile court movement was born, promising a treatment-oriented al-
ternative to deal with young people who committed criminal acts,
which are now characterized as acts of “delinquency.”97  Juvenile
court jurisdiction was not limited to delinquency offenses but also ex-
tended to so-called “status offenses,” offenses such as truancy and run-
ning away from home that are prohibited only for those occupying the
“status” of juveniles.98  Jurisdiction also extended to juveniles who
91. See supra notes 21–23, 80–85 and accompanying text.
92. See supra text and accompanying notes 36–39.
93. See supra text and accompanying notes 36, 40–45.
94. See supra text and accompanying note 61–65.
95. GARDNER, supra note 5, at 171.  Children under the age of fourteen, however,
were afforded access to the infancy defense. Id. at 172–73.
96. See, e.g., Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 659, 661–64 (1970); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 109 (1909).
97. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 1, 14.
98. Id. at 2-13, 2-14.
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committed no “offense” at all, but instead manifested undesirable sta-
tus conditions (hereinafter described as “status condition” jurisdic-
tion), such as being a “wayward child” or one “in need of
supervision.”99  Such conditions rendered juveniles subject to juvenile
court intervention with its rehabilitative dispositions.100  Today, juve-
nile courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over young people in both
the delinquency and status offense contexts.  As will be discussed, the
courts have struggled in adequately addressing vagueness attacks on
status condition statutes.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the juvenile courts operated with-
out legal oversight or monitoring.101  Beginning with the Kent case102
and continuing immediately with Gault103 and its progeny,104 the
Court viewed juvenile court dispositions skeptically, suggesting that
those involving confinement in juvenile institutions appeared more
punitive than rehabilitative.105  Specifically, the Court found that due
process was required in proceedings “whose object is to determine
whether [a juvenile] has committed acts that violate a criminal law
and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in
such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many
years.”106  Therefore, the Court constitutionalized the delinquency ad-
99. Id.
100. Id.  Juvenile court dispositions available for status offenders characteristically
consist of probation with court imposed conditions, but some jurisdictions permit
commitment to a juvenile institution. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES:
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 481–87 (2d ed. 2009).
101. SAMUEL M. DAVIS et al., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 860 (4th ed. 2009).
102. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (requiring right to hearing, access to
social recoils, and statement of reasons in proceedings waiving juvenile court ju-
risdiction to criminal court).
103. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring rights to notice, counsel, confrontation,
and the privilege against self-incrimination in delinquency adjudications).
104. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding violation of double jeopardy when
juvenile is tried in criminal court after an adjudication for the same offense in
juvenile court); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in delinquency adjudications).
105. See Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791,
823–33 (1982).  The Court cited with approval the following conclusion of a task
force studying juvenile justice: “In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and
rehabilitative rather than punitive.  In fact the distinction often disappears . . . .”
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5 (1971) (quoting PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JU-
VENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967).
106. Breed, 421 U.S. at 529 (holding that juveniles are put in jeopardy for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause at delinquency adjudications); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 36 (“A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution.”).  The Gault Court found the term “delin-
quent” has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term “criminal”
applied to adults. Id. at 24–25.
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judication process,107 requiring many of the procedural protections of
criminal trials theretofore unavailable under the traditional juvenile
court philosophy espousing procedural informality.108
Although recognizing its punitive aspects, the Court has never
judged juvenile justice as systematically non-therapeutic.  Indeed, in
McKeiver109 the Court denied juveniles the right to jury trials based,
in part, on the view that the presence of juries might frustrate the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system.110  Thus, juvenile courts
continue to be viewed as “civil” alternatives to the criminal justice sys-
tem, reflecting the state’s parens patriae power to treat children as
wards of the state, not fully responsible for their conduct and capable
of being rehabilitated.111  Accordingly, when punitive or non-rehabili-
tative dispositions are imposed, due process protections including fair
warning requirements are mandated.
B. Punishment v. Rehabilitation
In the Gault line of cases—again all concerning the delinquency
context and its necessary connection to the criminal law112—the
Court specifically spoke to the consequences of delinquency adjudica-
tions as the determining factor in requiring the due process protec-
tions imposed.113  The Court emphasized that dispositions of
adjudicated delinquents permit confinement in juvenile institutions—
entailing substantial losses of liberty that inevitably result in stigma-
tizing the juvenile with the pejorative label “delinquent.”114
It is not clear whether any of this speaks to the problem of defining
when a disposition in a status condition case constitutes punishment,
thus triggering fair warning requirements.  In the first place, the
Court’s focus on loss of liberty accompanied by pejorative stigma does
not offer a definition of “punishment.”  After all, persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution for being “mentally ill persons dan-
107. All of the Court’s cases dealt with delinquency adjudications. See supra notes
101–02; infra note 107.  It is uncertain whether the Court’s pronouncements also
apply to status offense adjudications given the fact that confinement in a juvenile
institution is sometimes not permitted. See DAVIS, supra note 100, at 295–96
(noting that many states do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in status
offense cases); supra note 99; infra note 117.
108. For discussion of the perceived virtues of informality, see, for example, Barry C.
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 150–51 (1984); Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States:
The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 170–72.
109. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
110. Id. at 541–51.
111. DAVIS, supra note 100, at 2–8.
112. See supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
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gerous to themselves or to others”115 surely experience as severe a loss
of liberty as adjudicated delinquents and, with the attendant label of
“crazy,” likely suffer at least as much stigmatization as that attached
to “delinquent.”  Yet the hospitalized persons are not “punished” as
the Court itself recognized by refusing to impose the “beyond a reason-
able doubt” standard required in delinquency adjudications116 to civil
commitment proceedings.117
Moreover, even if one sees the “loss of liberty and attendant
stigma” test as defining “punishment,” it may prove irrelevant in sta-
tus condition cases that lie outside the delinquency context.  Being ad-
judicated a “person in need of supervision,” for example, does not carry
the stigma of “delinquent” with its necessary connection to the crimi-
nal law.118  Thus, institutional confinement of a juvenile adjudicated
under a status condition measure would not in itself constitute pun-
ishment given the absence of the “delinquent” stigma.119
It is thus helpful to look beyond the Court’s juvenile cases to arrive
at an adequate definition of punishment as a possible disposition of a
juvenile adjudicated under a status condition provision.  Because the
imposition of the punitive sanction entails a variety of legal conse-
quences, the Supreme Court has addressed a number of cases turning
on whether or not punishment was present.120  The Court has never
offered a concise definition of the concept, although in Mendoza-Marti-
nez121 the Court noted several defining characteristics.  Punishment
involves an “affirmative disability or restraint” applied to “behavior”
for the purpose of promoting “the traditional aims” of punishment:
“retribution and deterrence.”122  Later, in the Wolfish case,123 the
Court added that to be punishment, coercive governmental action
must be motivated by punitive purposes, specifically retribution and
deterrence.124  The Wolfish Court further specified that particular re-
strictions, which on their face appear to be punitive, are not in fact
115. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
116. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
117. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (holding the “clear and convincing”
standard constitutionally adequate in civil commitment proceedings which are
not “punitive” in nature).
118. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
119. Some courts have seen the absence of the stigmatizing label of “delinquency” as
itself sufficient to distinguish status offense cases from delinquency cases for pur-
poses of determining whether or not the Gault protections apply in status offense
adjudications. See, e.g., In re Spaulding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975) (finding that
the privilege against self-incrimination requirement of Gault in delinquency ad-
judications is not required in child in need of supervision proceedings).
120. See Gardner, supra note 103, at 797–98.
121. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
122. Id. at 168–69.
123. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
124. Id. at 539.
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punitive if reasonable non-punitive governmental objectives support
them.125  Moreover, if a particular restriction appears unduly exces-
sive in light of its articulated non-punitive purpose, it may be assumed
that the purpose is, in fact, punitive.126
From a rich philosophical literature on the subject, several other
defining characteristics of punishment can be added.  Punishment en-
tails the purposeful infliction of pain or other unpleasant conse-
quences upon an actual or supposed offender because of his offense
against rules imposed and administered by authorized officials.127
Moreover, because punishment is, by definition, always meted out for
an offense, its kind and duration are determined by the severity of the
offense.128  Punishment is thus “determinate.”129
Unlike punishment, rehabilitative dispositions, while often un-
pleasant to their recipients, are not imposed to cause suffering for an
offense.  Rather, they are aimed at helping alleviate undesirable con-
ditions in a manner beneficial to the person.130  Rehabilitation thus
responds, not to action, but to unhealthy status conditions.  Moreover,
rehabilitative dispositions are subject to revision upon a showing that
a different regimen would produce more beneficial results or that a
change in the person’s condition has eliminated the need for further
rehabilitation.131  Because it is generally unknowable in advance how
effective a rehabilitative disposition will be for a particular person or
how long it will take to be effective, rehabilitative dispositions are
characteristically “indeterminate” in their duration.132
125. The Court observed: “[I]n the absence of a showing of intent to punish, a court
must look to see if a particular restriction or condition which may on its face
appear to be punishment, is instead but an incident of a legitimate non-punitive
governmental objective.”  441 U.S. at 539 n.20.  The Court added that “retribu-
tion and deterrence” are not legitimate non-punitive governmental objectives. Id.
126. Id.
127. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4–5 (2d ed. 2008).
128. See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, Some Problems with Theories of Punishment,
in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 173, 178–79 (Jerry B. Cederblom & William L.
Blizek, eds., 1977).  The widespread use of indeterminate sentencing, of course,
precludes knowledge of the exact term to be served by an offender at the time he
is sentenced for an offense. See Alan Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement:
Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 298–99 (1974).  Even
under indeterminate sentencing, however, the legislature sets maximum
sentences for each given offense, thus “determining” their duration.
129. Wasserstrom, supra note 128, at 178–79.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.  The conceptual distinction between punishment and rehabilitation described
in the text has been recognized by some courts.  For example, in In re Felder, 402
N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978), the court found minimum mandatory confine-
ments in juvenile institutions for serious offenses committed by juveniles to con-
stitute punishment for purposes of jury trial rights. Id. at 536.  The court
rejected the argument that the dispositions were “rehabilitative” and thus within
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C. Status Condition Rules and Vagueness
The Supreme Court has never considered a vagueness attack on a
statute defining juvenile court jurisdiction.  Given the fact that the
overwhelming majority of vagueness cases reaching the Supreme
Court have arisen in the criminal law context,133 it might therefore be
assumed that the lower courts would have regularly entertained
vagueness claims in delinquency cases given the linkage of such cases
to the criminal law.134  Instead, the courts have struggled in numer-
ous cases with vagueness problems in the status offense area, particu-
larly in the area of status condition rules.135  Appealing to the parens
the McKeiver holding that juvenile court proceedings need not include jury trials.
Id. at 531. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.  The Felder court saw
the fact that the dispositions were linked to the acts committed by juveniles and
increased in duration depending on the increased seriousness of the acts as clear
manifestations of punishment.  Such considerations belied a rehabilitative dispo-
sition that would have responded to the condition of the offender (not his acts)
and imposed an indefinite disposition (not a mandatory minimum term) until
such time as he was no longer in need of the state’s help.
133. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 133–198 and accompanying text.  The courts have occasionally
dealt with vagueness issues in status offense cases where an offense is entailed in
the rule rather than a mere status condition.  For example, several cases have
assessed the vagueness of “habitual truancy” measures. See, e.g., Sheshan v.
Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that a claim that the statutory term
“habitual truant” was unconstitutionally vague failed to raise a substantial fed-
eral question); Stern v. E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1980) (finding a statute im-
posing juvenile court jurisdiction for a child who “was habitually and without
justification truant from school” not unconstitutionally vague).  Moreover, several
courts have addressed vagueness claims regarding juvenile curfew provisions.
See, e.g., Nunez v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding unconstitu-
tionally vague a provision forbidding “loitering” by juveniles between the hours of
ten o’clock p.m. and daylight); People v. Daniel W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (upholding against vagueness attack a statute proscribing “loitering”
by persons under eighteen years upon public streets and public places between
the hours of ten p.m. and five a.m.); People v. Frank O., 247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (invalidating as vague a provision proscribing “loitering” in public
places by persons under the age of eighteen years between the hours of ten p.m.
and sunrise); Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1992) (finding unconstitution-
ally vague a provision prohibiting juveniles from “remain[ing] in or upon any
public place or any establishment” during nighttime hours).
An actual act or offense is entailed within both the truancy and curfew con-
texts—in the former, “going” someplace other than to school, in the latter, “going”
into public and staying there after a particular time.  Thus, unlike status condi-
tion rules, which entail no conduct rule component, see infra notes 142–186 and
accompanying text, the truancy and curfew statutes contain conduct rule compo-
nents.  In that situation, the courts correctly require fair warning and thus prop-
erly appreciate the conduct rule/decision rule distinction.  On the other hand, in
the context of status condition rules where only a decision rule exists, the courts
invariably engage in misguided searches for conduct rules.  I therefore limit my
critique in this Article to status condition rules.
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patriae powers of the state to rehabilitate troubled youth, the courts
have almost universally upheld status condition rules,136 sometimes
over strong dissents137 and despite heavy criticism from
commentators.138
In my critique of the status condition cases to follow, I will show
that they are woefully unconvincing examples of courts engaging in
tortured analysis amounting to no more than judicial question-beg-
ging139 or, perhaps even worse, simply drawing conclusions without so
much as an attempt at analysis.140  After reviewing two representa-
136. DAVIS, supra note 100, at 28; DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
315 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). But see Gonzalez v. Mailliard, no. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9,
1971), excerpted in 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 45 (1971), vacated and remanded
Mailliard v. Gonzalez, 416 U.S. 918 (1974) (declaring statutory language grant-
ing juvenile court jurisdiction over minors “in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life” to be unconstitutionally vague); see also Gesicki v. Oswald,
336 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding a statute, which permitted punish-
ment of juveniles found to be “wayward minors” who are “in danger of becoming
morally depraved,” unconstitutionally vague); infra notes 187–92 and accompa-
nying text.
137. See discussion of the S**** S**** and E.S.G. cases, infra notes 144–65, 172–86
and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, The Vagueness Doc-
trine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1977); Stuart Stiller & Carol Elder,
PINS—A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33 (1974); Note,
Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745
(1973); Robert G. Rose, Comment, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delin-
quents: Applying the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 184
(1972); Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and
Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (1969).
139. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58, 61 (D.C. 1975) (citing Patri-
cia A. v. City of New York, 286 N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1972)) (upholding “child in need
of supervision” provision); In re L.N., 263 A.2d 150, 153–54 (1970) (assuming
without analysis that a statutory provision allowing jurisdiction over juveniles
“engaging in conduct detrimental to health, morals, or general welfare” is not
vague because juvenile court systems in general had been upheld by a variety of
courts prior to Gault, and Gault presumably changes nothing regarding the “ba-
sic philosophy, idealism, and purposes of juvenile courts”); Patricia A., 286
N.E.2d at 434 (upholding provision allowing juvenile court jurisdiction over “per-
sons in need of supervision” (“PINS”) who, inter alia, are “incorrigible, ungovern-
able, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent” because
similarly broad language has been upheld in other cases); In re Napier, 532 P.2d
423 (Okla. 1975) (upholding PINS measure merely by citing Patricia A., E.S.G.,
and S**** S****, cases discussed infra at notes 144–181 and accompanying text);
see also discussion of S**** S**** v. Maine, 299 A.2d 560, 561 (Me. 1973) (uphold-
ing a Maine statute extending jurisdiction to juveniles “living in circumstances of
manifest danger of falling into vice or immorality”) infra notes 140–164 and ac-
companying text.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1956) (concluding
with no discussion that a juvenile court measure extending jurisdiction to “any
child under the age of eighteen who is in danger of becoming or remaining a per-
son who leads an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life or who is guilty of or takes
part in or submits to any immoral act or conduct” is not unconstitutionally
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tive cases, I will offer a critique by rethinking the cases in terms of the
conduct rule/decision rule distinction, arguing that sensitivity to the
distinction provides the basis for a sound analysis that justifies the
conclusions reached by the courts.  The approach herein is offered in
hopes of assisting future courts, for in the words of a leading commen-
tator, “[v]agueness challenges to [status condition] statutes will proba-
bly continue to mount.”141
1. Misguided Searches for Conduct Rules
A review of vagueness attacks on status condition statutes reveals
a common and recurring mistake: courts consistently fail to see the
statutes in their true character as exclusively person-oriented decision
rules142 and instead search vainly for a conduct component, thus di-
verting attention from genuine issues and obfuscating effective
analysis.143
Consider, for example, S**** S**** v. State144 in which the court
upheld, against a vagueness attack, a Maine statute extending juris-
diction to juveniles “living in circumstances of manifest danger of fall-
ing into vice or immorality.”  Because no underlying facts were
present, the court entertained a facial attack on the statutory lan-
guage.  Noting that juvenile provisions do not punish but are aimed at
“salvation” of the child,”145 the court rejected claims that Gault
ushered in the demise of parens patriae.146  Offering neither citation
to authority nor explanation, the court reasoned that “the statute does
not relate to a status,”147 concluding it would clearly be unconstitu-
tional if it did because “if no standard of conduct is specified at all,
legislation is unconstitutionally vague.”148
vague); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 504 So. 2d 289 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (dis-
missing “as simply without merit” and with no further comment a vagueness
claim against a provision permitting juvenile court jurisdiction over “a child in
need of supervision”).
141. DAVIS, supra note 100, at 28–29.
142. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
143. In addition to the S**** S**** and E.S.G. cases, discussed infra at notes 144–186
and accompanying text, see, for example, B.J.R., 332 A.2d at 60 (“children in
need of supervision” statute entails a conduct rule); In re Napier, 532 P.2d at
425–26 (“children in need of supervision statute entails a conduct rule”); Patricia
A., 286 N.E.2d at 433–34 (“persons in need of supervision” statute entails a con-
duct rule); In re Jackson, 497 P.2d 259, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that
the phrases “beyond the control and power of parents” and being “incorrigible”
give “fundamentally fair” notice to the child).
144. 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973).
145. Id. at 564.  The court presented a long history of juvenile justice in Maine. Id. at
565–67.
146. Id. at 567.
147. Id. at 568.
148. Id.
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Believing a conduct rule necessary to save the statute, the court
claimed to find one by interpreting the language “living in circum-
stances of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality”
to mean that if such “conduct” is continued, there is manifest danger
of the juvenile falling into “habits of criminal conduct when he be-
comes an adult,” such conduct being considered “vice and immoral-
ity.”149  Because the elements of criminal statutes are “clearly
described,”150 the court found that the juvenile statute satisfied fair
warning requirements.151  The court did not explain how giving a
clear definition of predicted future events supplies notice of the pre-
sent conduct serving as the basis for the future prediction.  As inter-
preted, the statute therefore essentially covered juveniles “living in
circumstances where there is a manifest risk that they might commit
a crime in the future.”  The court explicitly found that “living” in such
circumstances is the proscribed conduct of which the juvenile has
clear warning.152
Such analysis is obviously tortured.  First, the court offered no jus-
tification for its substitution of the criminal code for the legislature’s
“vice or immorality” language.  Those terms may include parts of the
criminal law but surely extend beyond criminal offenses.  Had the leg-
islature intended to limit “vice or immorality” to the criminal code, it
surely could have specifically done so.  In fact, status offense legisla-
tion is characteristically understood to cast a wide net to respond to
juveniles whose welfare is jeopardized by non-criminal, but neverthe-
less undesirable, behavior.153  More problematic, however, is the
court’s conclusion that “living” in a manner posing a risk of future
criminal consequences is “conduct.”  “Living” is the only element of the
statute speaking to the present, the remainder of the statute focuses
on the future possibility of committing criminal acts.  “Living” is thus
the only possible “conduct” element of the statute—the circumstance
requirements being non-conduct “circumstance elements.”154  But “liv-
149. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Thus, “men of common intelligence” would understand its meaning. Id. at 568
(applying the test announced in Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926); see supra note 34 and accompanying text).
152. 299 A.2d at 578–79.
153. See, e.g., E.S.G v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), discussed infra
notes 172–86 and accompanying text.
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (1985) (distinguishing “conduct” and “circumstance”
elements).  Conduct includes “voluntary” action. Id. at § 2.01; see also Martin v.
State, 17 So. 2d 427, 427 (1944) (finding “that an accusation of drunkenness in a
designated public place cannot be established by proof that the accused, while in
an intoxicated condition, was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that place by
the arresting officer”).  However, there is nothing voluntary about “living” (al-
though its opposite, “dying,” is sometimes voluntary).  Thus “living” is not an act
but a status condition.
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ing” is not “conduct;” it is the quintessential “state of being.”155
Clearly the court struggled in vain to find a conduct rule where none
exists.
A dissenting opinion in S **** S **** is no more helpful.  The dis-
sent found that the statute was aimed at “proscribing active conduct”
and not at penalizing a “juvenile’s status as such acquired by the pur-
suit of a certain pattern of living.”156  Thus the statute would be con-
stitutional only if it “provided the definition of the juvenile offense” in
terms “intelligible to guide the child” as well as his parents, the police,
and the courts.157  For the dissent, “the youth of this State are entitled
to know what conduct will jeopardize their right to live at home and
force them into a State institution.”158  Moreover, the “rule of law im-
plies . . . justice in application which cannot exist when legislation
provides no reasonable standard to determine prohibited conduct.”159
Thus, both the S**** S**** majority and dissent make the funda-
mental mistake of assuming that there must be a conduct rule for the
statute to escape unconstitutional vagueness.  Some rules are simply
free-standing decision rules with no conduct component.160  Such
rules, while characteristically vague, are almost always constitutional
outside the criminal law context.161  Failing to appreciate this fact,
the majority struggles to find a conduct rule where none exists, while
the dissent finds unconstitutional vagueness for want of a conduct
rule.
The dissent is correct that there is no conduct rule entailed in the
statute, but that does not necessarily render it unconstitutionally
vague.  The statute is best understood as one defining a status condi-
It is, of course, sometimes possible to choose one’s status condition of “living in
circumstances . . . .”  One could choose to be “living in [the] circumstances” of
Paris or London.  In such situations, one’s status is the product of conduct, the
voluntary move to Paris or London.  There is, however, no reason to assume that
the Maine legislature intended the “living in circumstances” provision to apply
only where juveniles have chosen the “circumstances” of their “living.”  Juveniles
usually don’t have that choice.  Surely the statute is meant to apply in a case, for
example, where a juvenile lives in an impoverished environment, by no choice of
his own, where he is constantly subjected to peer pressure to engage in anti-so-
cial, immoral, or potentially criminal activity. See infra notes 167–71 and accom-
panying text.
The reference, supra, to Martin v. State is by analogy only.  The “living in
circumstances” statute is not a criminal statute.
155. For an extensive discussion of the distinction between conduct (or acts) and sta-
tus conditions, see generally Gardner, supra note 14.
156. 299 A.2d at 576 (Dufresne, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 579.
159. Id. at 577.
160. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
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tion, a “person-oriented decision rule” with no conduct component.162
As such, it is aimed at assessing the “whole person of the juvenile as a
social being”163 in order for the decisionmaker to make a prediction of
the future.164  As a parens patriae manifestation of state power, the
statute is akin to those authorizing involuntary hospitalization of the
“mentally ill and dangerous.”165  Such statutes make no attempt at
notifying the public,166 but are instead directed entirely at informing
official decisionmakers as to the propriety of exercising beneficent
state power.
It seems clear that this statute was not addressed to juveniles.
They are not expected to know when they are “living in circumstance
of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality.”  As
young, malleable people, they are in the process of learning the mean-
ing of “vice and immorality” as they progress towards responsible
adulthood.  In assisting this process, the statute allows deci-
sionmakers to exercise case-by-case discretion to protect juveniles
from the negative consequences of “habits of vice or immorality” while,
at the same time, affording the opportunity to teach them the mean-
ing of those terms.
Again, person-oriented decision rules are seldom unconstitution-
ally vague.167  This is particularly true of such statutes directed to
young people where the risk of vague statues chilling the exercise of
protected liberty168 is minimal, given that the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that minors possess only meager liberty interests.169  There-
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying note 80.
164. See supra text accompanying note 82.
165. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451–52 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. But see the Gesicki case discussed
infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 40, 45 and accompanying text.
169. For example, in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984), a case upholding pre-
adjudication detention of minors accused of acts of delinquency who were deemed
to pose a risk of additional criminal behavior, the Court said this about juvenile’s
interest in being free from confinement:
The juvenile’s . . . interest in freedom from institutional restraint . . . is
undoubtedly substantial.  But that interest must be qualified by the rec-
ognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody.  Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity take
care of themselves.  They are assumed to be subject to the control of their
parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as
parens patriae.  In this respect, the juvenile’s liberty interest may, in
appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State’s “parens pa-
triae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.”
Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1981) (citations omitted).
See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600–01 (1979), where the Court opined
that for a minor the infringement of liberty entailed in being involuntarily hospi-
talized results in less “stigma” than being left free with untreated mental health
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fore, the statute in S**** S**** is almost certainly constitutional, but
not for the reasons given by the majority.  Of course, a different con-
clusion would be reached if the disposition of the juvenile adjudicated
in S**** S**** were in fact punitive.  If so, want of a conduct rule
would render the statute unconstitutional, both on vagueness
grounds170 and as a violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Robinson v. California.171
One other example should suffice to illustrate misguided judicial
searches for conduct rules in cases assessing vagueness claims di-
rected at status condition statutes.  In E.S.G. v. State,172 the court
upheld, against a vagueness attack, a Texas statute extending juris-
diction to juveniles who “habitually so deport [themselves] as to injure
or endanger the morals or health of [themselves] or others.”173  Unlike
the S**** S**** case just considered, the court in E.S.G. spelled out
the underlying factual context that triggered state intervention.  The
appellant was a fourteen-year-old girl who had left home to live with a
girl reputed to be a prostitute and who, with the other girl, frequented
the bus station and other public places.  At the request of her mother,
the police found the appellant partially dressed and in a transient
apartment with a young adult male.  The appellant was adjudicated
under the statute and the juvenile court committed her for an indefi-
nite period to a state institution.
In upholding the statute against the appellant’s vagueness attack,
the E.S.G. court observed that the statute was necessarily broadly
worded because specificity is impossible in defining “all the types and
problems, and Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)), where the Court upheld a broader
standard for obscenity for juveniles than that applied to adults recognizing that
“even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, ‘the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults.’” See also infra notes 210–21 and accompanying text (discussing the Su-
preme Court’s special treatment of minors).
170. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text; infra notes 187–191 and accompa-
nying text.
171. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding punishment of a status condition constitutes a viola-
tion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); see also discussion of Gesicki
v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), infra notes 187–92 and accompany-
ing text).
172. 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
173. The statute has subsequently been repealed. DAVIS, supra note 100, at 27–28.
For courts upholding similar statutory language, see, for example, State v. Mat-
tiello, 225 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966) (upholding provision extending
jurisdiction to any “unmarried female . . . who is in manifest danger of failing [sic]
into habits of vice or who is leading a vicious life”), and In re L.N., 263 A.2d 150,
153 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. (1970) (upholding provision extending jurisdiction
to juveniles “engaging in conduct detrimental to [their] health, morals, or general
welfare”).
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patterns of behavior . . . injurious to a child.”174  Such statutory
breadth was to be expected given “the need to correct habits and pat-
terns of behavior which are injurious to the health or morals of the
child,” a matter “going to the very heart” of juvenile court legisla-
tion.175  Nevertheless, the court found that words such as “health” and
“morals” have a “well-accepted and understood meaning” such that
they are understood by “men of ordinary intelligence,”176 thus afford-
ing fair warning.
As with the S**** S**** court and most others reviewing similar
statutes,177 the E.S.G. court felt impelled to find a conduct rule in or-
der to uphold the statute.  But again, as in S**** S****, the statute in
E.S.G. is best understood as a person-oriented decision rule with no
conduct component.178  “Habitually deporting oneself so as to endan-
ger” is language much more at home with assessing dangerous or
troubled persons, rather than specifying any particular action or con-
duct.  Thus, it is who the juvenile is—his status condition— that mat-
ters, not what he has done.  The court itself seems to sense as much
with its realization that the statute is necessarily vague in order to
achieve its purposes.
Also similar to S**** S****, a dissent in E.S.G. correctly finds that
no conduct rule is entailed in the Texas statute but again mistakenly
concludes that such absences necessarily render the measure uncon-
stitutionally vague.  Assuming that all rules must entail conduct com-
ponents179 and interpreting the statue as a “directive addressed to
children,”180 the dissent finds the statute unconstitutional for want of
a clear conduct rule.  Thus, as in S**** S**** and virtually every
other similar case,181 all members of the E.S.G. court fail to appreci-
174. 447 S.W.2d at 226.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 227.  The court concluded that “this fourteen-year-old girl understood” that
such conduct as running away from home was “injurious to her morals.” Id. at
226.
177. See supra note 143.
178. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.
179. The dissent saw the distinction between status condition rules and conduct rules
as “illusory.”  447 S.W.2d at 231 (Cardena, J., dissenting).
180. The dissent explained:
Here, a directive addressed to children is couched in terms which have
been the source of controversy among theologians, philosophers and
judges for centuries.  It is one thing to say that a judge, drawing upon his
experience and knowledge of the law and of “meanings” attached to neb-
ulous terms at common law, should understand what is moral and what
is not.  It is another thing to expect a child of ten or, as in this case, of
fourteen, to understand the meaning of words which judges are unable
to define while assuring us that the language is “perfectly clear.”
Id.
181. See cases cited supra note 143.
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ate the significance of the conduct rule/decision rule distinction and
thus fail to utilize it to resolve the issues raised in the case.
Before leaving E.S.G., however, it should be noted that the dissent
correctly observes that the “provision in question is vague enough to
allow almost any child, given compromising circumstances, to be
caught up in the jurisdictional net of the juvenile court.”182  Such a
conclusion is true of virtually all status condition provisions in juve-
nile statutes nationwide.  The E.S.G. dissent saw such a consequence
as particularly troubling given the disposition in the case: confine-
ment in a state institution for possibly as much as seven years.183  For
the dissent, such a consequence requires greater definiteness than a
vague measure imposing, say, a small fine.184
These concerns merit attention.  A lengthy commitment under the
Texas statute might not be particularly troubling if the disposition
were genuinely rehabilitative and helpful to the child.  If so, such a
commitment, while perhaps controversial on policy grounds,185 would
be constitutional.186  On the other hand, if the commitment were not
rehabilitative, but rather punitive, much different constitutional con-
sequences follow.
2. Status Condition Statutes and Punishment
As noted earlier, where punishment is imposed, conduct rules are
constitutionally required.187  Thus, if punishment is imposed for the
violation of status condition rules, which lack conduct components,
then those rules are unconstitutional on two grounds.
Imposition of punishment constitutionally requires rules clearly
defining the conduct to be punished.  Thus, punishment cannot be vis-
ited on juveniles adjudicated under status condition rules, a form of
person-oriented decision rules.  These points are made clear in Gesicki
v. Oswald,188 where the court invalidated provisions of a New York
statute which permitted punishment of juveniles found to be “way-
ward minors in danger of becoming morally depraved.”189  The “pun-
ishment” consisted of being sentenced to terms in an adult penal
institution with no pretense of “rehabilitation.”190  The court found
182. 447 S.W.2d at 232.
183. Id. at 228.
184. Id.
185. See infra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 112–61 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
188. 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
189. Id. at 373.
190. The court found that the confinement could not be deemed “rehabilitative” in na-
ture because “the statute fails to require any course of treatment at all.” Id. at
378–79.
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the statute unconstitutionally vague for want of a clear conduct rule
and also violative of Robinson for punishing a status condition.191
Gesicki is a relatively straightforward decision.  Being a “wayward
minor in danger of becoming morally depraved” is obviously a status
condition, a person-oriented decision rule with no conduct component,
and the disposition was quite clearly meant to be punitive given its
excessiveness in light of any arguable non-punitive, rehabilitative
purposes.192  Most cases, however, are not as straight-forward as
Gesicki.
Often, the question of whether a given disposition of a juvenile ad-
judicated under a status condition is unconstitutional “punishment” or
permissible “rehabilitation” is uncertain.  Consider, for example, a va-
riation on the facts of Blondheim v. State.193  Suppose a minor is adju-
dicated an “incorrigible [child] who is beyond the control and power of
his parents by reason of the . . . nature of said child.”194  Such a rule is
clearly a person-oriented decision rule with no conduct component.
Suppose the juvenile is committed to a juvenile institution at disposi-
tion.195  Is the statute vague, and is Robinson offended?  The answers
are only “yes” if the commitment constitutes “punishment.”
Some commitments are clearly punitive,196 but others often consti-
tute non-punitive rehabilitation.  Courts are thus required to distin-
guish punishment and rehabilitation.197  Unfortunately, their
decisions often simply beg the question, one way or the other, without
adequate legal analysis.198
191. Id. at 373; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
192. See also Lollis v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y 1970) (find-
ing cruel and unusual punishment where a fourteen-year-old girl confined to a
state training school provoked a fight therein and was kept in isolated custody for
two weeks in a room stripped of everything but a wooden bunk, without a mat-
tress during day time, and with virtually no natural light).
193. 529 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
194. Id. at 1100.  In the actual Blondheim case the juvenile was adjudicated under an
alternative provision of the statute, defining “incorrigibility” as being “beyond the
control . . . of [her] parents . . . by reason of [her] conduct,” and the court applied
this provision to the specific act of running away from home. Id. at 1101 (empha-
sis added).  Thus, the version of the statute at issue in Blondheim contained a
conduct rule component. Id.
195. This was the disposition in Blondheim and also in the S**** S**** and E.S.G.
cases considered earlier. See supra notes 144–81 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., discussion supra note 132.
197. See supra notes 112–32 and accompanying text.
198. For example, in Blondheim the court assumed that commitments of “delinquents”
and “incorrigible” juveniles in the same institutional facility would necessarily
constitute “punishing” the latter.  529 P.2d at 1101.  The court attempted no ex-
planation of why commitment to the institution would constitute punishment,
rather than rehabilitation, for either class of adjudicated juveniles. See also
State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (seeing no distinction
in punishment and rehabilitation and noting that “punishment [may do] as much
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D. Summary
I have argued that attending to the conduct rule/decision rule dis-
tinction is central to resolving vagueness attacks on status condition
rules in juvenile justice.  Once understood as decision rules with no
conduct component, such rules are not constitutionally vague unless
they trigger a punitive disposition.  Failure to appreciate this insight
has led the courts, and even some leading commentators,199 to confuse
the inquiry by assuming that fair warning must be afforded to
juveniles when in fact the statutes are addressed solely to official deci-
sionmakers.  Where no punishment is at stake, the search for fair
warning is thus a red herring that impedes sound analysis when as-
sessing the constitutionality of status condition statutes.  These stat-
utes are purposely vague, allowing decisionmakers to exercise
discretion on a case-by-case basis.  Such discretion is characteristic of
statutes authorizing state-imposed rehabilitation through person-ori-
ented decision rules that are almost always constitutional.200
To say that status condition statutes are not unconstitutionally
vague is not to say, however, that they are free from controversy.  A
variety of policy issues call into question the wisdom of their contin-
ued employment.201  The statutes obviously vest immense discretion
in decisionmakers who in particular cases may exercise it for arbitrary
or discriminatory purposes.  While such concerns are somewhat ame-
liorated by the fact that most status condition adjudications are insti-
gated by the juvenile’s parent or guardian,202 concerns regarding
abuse of discretion by official functionaries are nevertheless real.203
Whether continuing to grant broad discretion allowing intervention to
to rehabilitate, correct and direct an errant youth as does the . . . philosophy of
focusing upon the particular characteristics of the individual juvenile”).
199. Samuel Davis has stated that a “major problem” with status condition provisions
is “determining exactly what conduct is included.” DAVIS, supra note 100, at 28
(emphasis added).
200. See supra notes 87–94, 165 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Orman W. Kitcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should Be
Eliminated, 57 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1977); Christine Rinik, Juvenile Status Offend-
ers: A Comparative Analysis, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151 (1982) (arguing for
diverting CHINS from juvenile court).
202. See Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 138, at 18, 22; Still & Elder, supra note 138,
at 53.
203. For example, studies have suggested that status condition provisions are more
often invoked against girls than boys. See, e.g., Christine Alder, Gender Bias in
Juvenile Diversion, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 400 (1984); Meda Chesney-Lind, Judi-
cial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender: Training Women to Know Their
Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121 (1977); Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustified
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1386–89 (1974).
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help troubled juveniles like E.S.B.204 is worth the risk of its abuse is a
question worthy of consideration by policymakers.205
In this Part, I have explored vagueness issues relating to status
condition rules as a subset of the status offense jurisdiction of juvenile
courts.206  As shown, the courts consistently and mistakenly interpret
such rules as entailing conduct rule components.  Such rules are not,
however, addressed to juveniles but always to official decisionmakers.
Outside the juvenile justice system, there is one other area where
rules are arguably addressed solely to young people: rules utilized in
maintaining student discipline.
IV. SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY RULES AND VAGUENESS
Although the lower courts have considered a variety of claims at-
tacking school disciplinary rules as unconstitutionally vague,207 the
Supreme Court has done so on only one occasion.  In the Fraser
case,208 discussed in detail later, the Court signaled that educational
policymakers are allowed broad deference in implementing open-en-
ded disciplinary rules in order to maintain order in their schools.
Before considering Fraser and representative samples of the lower
court vagueness case law, it is important to understand the Court’s
general attitude towards students in public schools.  The attitude is
complicated and perhaps ambiguous.209  Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Court has generally adopted a paternalistic posture towards
young people—students in particular.
204. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INST. OF JUDICIAL AD-
MIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 1–2
(1982) (proposing elimination of status offense jurisdiction and sole reliance on
programs of voluntary, non-judicial assistance for troubled youths and their fami-
lies).  Moreover, some opponents of status offense jurisdiction argue that a protec-
tionist posture towards juveniles, particularly adolescents, is misguided in light
of social science evidence that suggests their cognitive abilities are essentially the
same as adults, and thus juveniles should be treated as autonomous persons. See
GARDNER, supra note 5, at 6, 12–13.
206. Of course, some rules imposing status offense jurisdiction, such as rules proscrib-
ing running away from home, seem clearly addressed to juveniles. See supra note
135.
207. See infra notes 249–80 and accompanying text.
208. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see discussion infra
notes 225–48 and accompanying text.
209. For thorough examinations of the Court’s school cases, see Anne Proffitt Dupre,
Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?  Keeping Order in the Public
Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49 (1996) and Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Stu-
dent Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating
Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1996).
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A. The Supreme Court Case Law
In the majority of its cases, the Supreme Court has viewed young
people, not as full-fledged autonomous persons, but instead as vulner-
able and dependent beings in need of protection.210  Outside the
school context, for example, the Court has stated that “[m]ost chil-
dren, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judg-
ments concerning many decisions . . . .  Parents can and must make
those judgments.”211  The Court has more recently noted that young
people “lack maturity,” tend to possess an “underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,” and possess personality traits that are “more transi-
tory” and “less fixed” than those of adults.212
The Court’s public education cases reflect a similar protectionist
posture towards students.  While the Tinker case announced that stu-
dents “do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,”213 the Court has at the same time
embraced “the paternalism inherent in school discipline”214 by al-
lowing school officials broad discretion in maintaining order within
their institutions.
In its search and seizure cases, the Court has recognized minimal
Fourth Amendment protection for students while at school215 but has
nevertheless defined the power of educators as “custodial,” “tutelary,”
and that of a “reasonable guardian” who “for many purposes acts in
loco parentis.”216  Similarly, the Court has observed that “without first
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin
to educate their students.”217
210. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
211. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
212. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).  However, not all the Court’s
cases are clearly protectionist in their view of young people.  For example, in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the
Court held that minor females, at least if they’re competent, have a constitutional
right to decide to have abortions without the consent of their parents.
213. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding
that school children have First Amendment rights to exercise political speech in
school so long as they do not “materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))).
214. Hafen, supra note 209, at 689.
215. See generally, Martin R. Gardner, The Fourth Amendment and the Public
Schools: Observations on an Unsettled State of Search and Seizure Law, 36 CRIM.
L. BULL. 373 (2000).
216. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 665 (1995) (upholding drug
testing of students as a precondition for participating in school athletics).
217. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002) (uphold-
ing drug testing of students as precondition for participating in school extra-cur-
ricular activities).
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In assessing due process claims, the Court has held that students
enjoy protected property and liberty interests when subjected to tem-
porary suspensions from school.218  Such interests appear minimal,
however, in light of subsequent case law holding that a student’s lib-
erty interest in being free from bodily restraint and punishment could
be denied with no advance procedural protections.219  The Court saw
excessive corporal punishment in schools as “an aberration,”220 essen-
tially trusting the good faith of educators to discipline their students
within reason.221
In the free speech cases, the Court appeared initially in Tinker to
embrace a view of educational policy that saw students and teachers
as adversaries, thus empowering students to confront the authority of
the school through the courts.222  While such a view well describes
Tinker,223 later free speech cases have clearly moved away from such
a strong student rights position and towards the position expressed
throughout the Court’s school cases: teachers should have broad
power to teach and discipline their students free from legally recogniz-
able objections from their students.224
As mentioned earlier, the Fraser case is fundamental to under-
standing the Court’s position on possible vagueness of school discipli-
nary rules.  After being counseled by two teachers that his speech
might be inappropriate, Matthew Fraser nevertheless gave the speech
at a school assembly nominating his friend for student office.225  The
speech was laced with sexual innuendo and resulted in a variety of
reactions from the assembled students ranging from bewilderment
and embarrassment to hooting accompanied by sexually graphic ges-
tures.226  School officials suspended Fraser from school for three days
and removed his name from the list of candidates for violation of a
school rule prohibiting “conduct which materially and substantially
218. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (finding that students are entitled to oral or
written notice of reasons for suspensions up to ten days in duration as well as an
opportunity to explain themselves).
219. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that twenty licks inflicted by a
teacher with a paddle injuring a student did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
220. Id. at 677.
221. The Ingraham Court did point out that while no procedural protections were re-
quired prior to administering corporal punishment, common law remedies were
available after the fact should the punishment be excessive. Id.
222. Dupre, supra note 209, at 72–73.
223. Goss, 419 U.S. 565, also represents such a view, described by Professor Dupre as
the “social reconstruction” theory of education.  Dupre, supra note 209, at 64–67.
224. See generally, Dupre, supra note 209.
225. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
226. Id. at 677–78.  It was also reported that on the day after Fraser’s speech a teacher
found it necessary to forego part of the scheduled class lecture in order to discuss
the speech. Id.
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interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of ob-
scene, profane language or gestures.”227
Fraser attacked the school action in federal court, arguing, among
other things, that the school rule was unconstitutionally vague.228  Af-
ter the district court sustained the vagueness challenge, the Supreme
Court eventually reversed,229 upholding the school action and the con-
stitutionality of the rule.230
The Court distinguished Tinker as a case involving political
speech,231 unlike the speech given by Fraser.  The Court identified the
“role and purpose” of public school education as preparing students for
citizenship by inculcating the “habits and manners of civility” essen-
tial to a democratic society.232  In pursuing these educational pur-
poses, the Court recognized that school authorities act in loco parentis
in determining what manner of speech in the classroom or in the
school assembly is inappropriate.233
As to the alleged vagueness of the rule, the Court interpreted it as
embodying a conduct rule component and concluded that it, along with
the admonitions of the teachers, gave fair warning to Fraser.234  How-
ever, in language suggesting that the rule might instead be under-
stood as a decision rule exclusively, the Court said:
We have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools re-
quires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we
have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher
relationship.  Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanc-
tions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the education
227. Id. at 678.
228. Brief of Respondents at 36–39, Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(No. 84-1667).
229. Five members joined in a majority, two Justices concurred, and two dissented.
478 U.S. at 676.
230. Id. at 686–87.
231. 478 U.S. 680–81. Tinker involved students wearing black armbands to school to
protest the war in Vietnam.  393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
232. 478 U.S. at 681.
233. Id. at 684.  The Court has decided two student speech cases subsequent to Fraser.
Neither case cast any doubt on the Court’s recognition of the broad power pos-
sessed by school officials to police their institutions.  In Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Court upheld the actions of a school principle
as “reasonable regulation” when the principal exercised editorial control over the
contents of a high school newspaper deemed offensive and inappropriate. Id. at
270.  In Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), the Court upheld the suspension
of a high school student for displaying a banner believed by school officials to
encourage illegal drug activity.  The Court recognized the “difficult and vitally
important [job]” of school officials in governing public schools. Id. at 409.
234. The Court concluded that “[t]he school disciplinary rule proscribing ‘obscene’ lan-
guage and prespeech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to Fraser
that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions.”  478 U.S. at 686.
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process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal
code which imposes criminal sanctions.235
Justice Stevens dissented, concluding that the rule was unconsti-
tutionally vague and resulted in Fraser being “punished” without fair
warning.236  Stevens found that Fraser was “entitled to fair notice of
the scope of the prohibition,”237 thus dismissing out of hand the possi-
bility that the rule might be permissible as a decision rule with no
conduct rule component.
On close examination, it appears that both the Fraser majority and
Justice Stevens in dissent misconceived the issue in the case.  The
problem with the rule imposed by the school in Fraser was not that
the rule was vague, but that it did not apply to Fraser’s speech.  None
of the individual words he spoke were themselves inappropriate.238
As Justice Blackmun noted in a concurring opinion, Fraser’s remarks
were not “obscene.”239  The “most that can be said about the speech”
was that it “exceeded permissible limits” and justified the imposition
of discipline in order to teach Fraser “how to conduct civil and effective
public discourse,” a matter well within the school’s discretion.240  Jus-
tice Blackmun thus appears to see that it was sufficient that school
officials acted under an unarticulated decision rule allowing them
“discretion . . . to teach high school students how to conduct civil and
effective discourse.”241
It thus appears that the Fraser Court fell into the same trap that
clouds the analysis of the status condition vagueness cases discussed
earlier.  The Court reached to find fair warning and a corresponding
conduct rule when it was unnecessary to do so.  The correct way to
resolve the vagueness issue in Fraser is to realize that no conduct rule
need be present for the sanctions against Fraser to be upheld.  All that
is needed is a decision rule addressed to school officials allowing them
235. Id.
236. Id. at 691–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 691, 695 n.5.
238. Id. at 687–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 687.  Fraser gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his
shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the
students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If neces-
sary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn’t attack things
in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he
succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each
and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between
you and the best our high school can be.
Id.
240. Id. at 687–88.
241. Id. at 687.
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to determine appropriate student behavior on a case-by-case basis in
order to teach “habits and manners of civility” in the multitude of situ-
ations that might arise during the school day during which such les-
sons should be taught.  Indeed, school officials could easily have
resorted to another provision of the student conduct code which
stated: “Any student who willfully performs any act which . . . is detri-
mental to . . . any aspect of educational process within the Bethel
School District, shall be subject to discipline, suspension, or expul-
sion.”242  This rule is broader than the obscenity rule chosen to deal
with Fraser’s situation and seems clearly addressed to official deci-
sionmakers and not to students.  Given the Fraser Court’s acknowl-
edgment of broad authority to school officials in maintaining
discipline, and considering the Court’s posture in other cases,243 this
decision rule would surely have been constitutional if it had been the
basis for the sanctions imposed upon Fraser, so long as those sanc-
tions did not constitute punishment.244
Justice Stevens was correct in concluding that Fraser would be en-
titled to fair warning if his suspension and removal from the valedicto-
rian list constituted “punishment.”245  Stevens offered no analysis for
his conclusion that Fraser had been punished.  In fact, the sanctions
imposed can easily be understood as non-punitive measures aimed at
regulating educational quality in the future rather than making Fra-
ser suffer for past misconduct.246  The suspension could reasonably
have been imposed to avoid educational disruptions resulting from
Fraser’s presence at school in the days immediately following his
speech.247  Similarly, the removal from the candidate list could be
seen as reasonable action aimed at avoiding the risk of another inap-
propriate speech being given at graduation and not as an attempt to
make Fraser suffer for his past speech.248
Thus the analysis in Fraser would have been much clearer and
more convincing had the Court not succumbed to the temptation to
elicit a conduct rule, with its corresponding fair warning requirement,
when neither was necessary to correctly decide the case.  Not surpris-
242. BETHEL SCH. DIST. NO. 403, STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (2009),
available at http://media.bethelsd.org/website/resources/ee/weblog/students/pdf/
Rights_and_Responsibilities.pdf.
243. See supra notes 213–24 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
245. 478 U.S. at 692–93.
246. See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text.
247. See id.; Clements v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 585 P.2d 197,
203 (1978) (finding that school suspension is not “punishment” for double jeop-
ardy purposes but rather a “remedial” sanction aimed at protecting the educa-
tional environment).
248. See supra notes 120–129 and accompanying text.
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ingly, as the next section illustrates, Fraser sends a somewhat confus-
ing message to lower courts faced with school rule vagueness claims.
B. Conduct Rules/Decision Rules and Lower Court Case
Law
Failure to attend to the conduct rule/decision rule distinction re-
sults in two kinds of mistakes by lower courts deciding vagueness at-
tacks on school disciplinary rules.  Some courts mistakenly find such
rules unconstitutionally vague for want of fair warning when the rele-
vant rule constitutes a constitutionally permissible decision rule with
no conduct rule component.249  Other courts mistakenly uphold deci-
sion rules in situations where such rules impose punishment, thus ap-
proving rules failing to provide constitutionally necessary fair
warning.  Two case examples should suffice to illustrate these
mistakes.250
1. Mistaken Vagueness
In Packer v. Board of Education of Tomaston,251 the Connecticut
Supreme Court entertained a vagueness claim brought against a disci-
plinary rule permitting expulsion of students for conduct occurring off
school grounds if the conduct is “seriously disruptive of the educa-
tional process.”252  The court found the rule failed to give fair warning
to a student who had been expelled under the rule for possessing ma-
249. See, e.g. Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding unconstitutionally vague a rule prohibiting “gang related activities”);
Dothan City Bd. of Educ. v. V.M.H., 660 So. 2d 1328 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (finding
unconstitutionally vague a rule prohibiting “possession of any item which may be
conceivably used as a weapon”); Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding unconstitutionally vague a rule prohibiting
“extremes of hair styles”); Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1975) (finding
unconstitutionally vague a rule prohibiting “conduct inimical to the best interests
of the school”); see also discussion infra notes 249–60 and accompanying text.
250. A third category of cases, while correct in their outcomes, represents the red her-
ring confusion illustrated by the S**** S**** and E.S.B. cases, see supra notes
144–81 and accompanying text, and finds supposedly adequate fair warning in
decision rules that in fact inadequately warn. See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren
Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ. 307 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding students had fair
warning under a rule prohibiting wearing or possessing items that are “racially
divisive or create ill will or hatred”); Clements v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan County
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 585 P.2d 197, 199 (Wyo. 1978) (finding students had fair warn-
ing under a rule prohibiting “behavior which in the judgment of the local [school]
board is clearly detrimental to the education, welfare, safety, or morals of other
pupils”).
251. 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998).
252. Id. at 128.
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rijuana and drug paraphernalia in his car as he was driving on city
streets.253
The court recognized the vagueness doctrine’s interrelated ratio-
nales of fair warning protection against arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement but assumed, without citation to authority, that both ra-
tionales are relevant in every vagueness claim, thus assuming that all
rules depriving protected interests must provide fair warning.254
Therefore, in the court’s view, because the student’s expulsion denied
him his property interest in education, he could not be expelled unless
he had fair warning.255  The court saw the “fundamental inquiry” in
the case to be whether “a person of ordinary intelligence” could deter-
mine whether he could be expelled from school for possessing mari-
juana in his car on city streets after school hours.256  The court thus
assumed that the rule was a conduct rule addressed to students.
School officials argued that the rule granted them complete discre-
tion to determine whether off-campus conduct was “seriously disrup-
tive of the education process”—in essence arguing that the rule was
exclusively a decision rule.257  The court rejected this argument, con-
cluding that the school official’s “opinion” of the meaning of the “seri-
ously disruptive” language was “irrelevant.”258  In the eyes of the
court, the rule must be a conduct rule providing “constitutionally ade-
quate notice” to the student.259  Such notice must come from “the lan-
guage of the [rule] . . . not from opinions expressed by persons not
authorized to construe the statute.”260
To conclude that school officials are not authorized to decide
whether a matter is “seriously disruptive of the educational process,”
and that their opinions on the issue are essentially irrelevant, is seri-
ously at odds with Fraser’s approval of vesting broad discretion in
school officials to “impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of
conduct disruptive of the educational process.”261  While students are
entitled to procedural protections before they can be denied their edu-
253. The court struck down the statute as applied but concluded that it might provide
fair warning in other contexts. Id. at 134.
254. Id. at 128.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 129.  The court engaged in an extensive analysis of what the terms “seri-
ously,” “disruptive,” “educational,” and “process” meant in order to decide
whether “a person of ordinary intelligence” would understand their meanings,
and it eventually concluded that such a person “could not be reasonably certain”
whether possession of marijuana “by itself and without some tangible nexus to
school operation” would be “seriously disruptive of the educational process” under
the circumstances. Id. at 130.
257. Id. at 130.
258. Id. at 131.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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cational interests,262 there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s case law
that requires that they be given fair warning as mandated under the
principle of legality.263  Thus, it would be constitutionally permissible
to interpret the rule in Packer as the free-standing decision rule it
clearly seems to be,264 entrusting school officials to determine which
off-campus conduct risks disrupting the education process.  Therefore,
the expulsion of the student in Packer was constitutionally permissi-
ble even if he lacked fair warning.265
262. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 32–36, 87, 213–44 and accompanying text.
264. The interpretation of the rule becomes solely a matter of statutory interpretation
with no constitutional issues.  The legislative history of the rule in Packer gives
every indication that the Connecticut legislature intended the rule to be a deci-
sion rule exclusively.  The statute in Packer was the product of an earlier statute
permitting “[the] school board to expel any student found guilty of ‘conduct inimi-
cal to the best interests of the school.’ ” Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68, 69 (1975).
The earlier statute was deemed unconstitutionally vague in Mitchell and the
statute in Packer was passed in response to the action of the Mitchell court.
Packer, 717 A.2d at 133.  The earlier statute, with its “best interests of the school”
language, is clearly a decision rule only.  The “seriously disruptive of the educa-
tional process” language, which was found vague in Packer, was aimed at replac-
ing the earlier vague “best interests of the school” provision with “a clearly
defined statutory scheme which affords due process to all persons involved.” Id.
at 133 (quoting Comm. B. 5550, 1975 Sess., Gen. Assem. (Conn. 1975)). There is
no reason to believe that in passing the latter measure the legislature had devi-
ated from its desire to enact a decision rule directed to school officials rather than
a conduct rule aimed at students.
265. Ordinarily, the conclusion in the text is true unless the sanction imposed under
the rule were punitive. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  However,
under the facts of Packer, even if the sanction—expulsion—were punitive, the
rule would not be unconstitutionally vague for want of fair warning.  The stu-
dent’s conduct in the case, possessing illegal drugs, was clearly illegal and known
to be so by the public at large.  Thus the student would have little chance of suc-
cessfully arguing that the school rule was vague.  The point is clearly illustrated
in Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 48–49 (1975), where the defendant argued that a
statute proscribing “crimes against nature” did not adequately warn him that his
act of forcible cunnilingus was covered by the statute.  Admitting that the statute
was broadly drafted, the Court rejected the defendant’s vagueness attack in light
of the fact that defendant’s obviously wrongful conduct put him on notice that
“his conduct might be within [the] scope [of the statutes].” Id. at 53.  Surely the
student in Packer was on notice that his wrongful conduct “might be within the
scope” of the school rule.
In any event, the sanction in Packer, expulsion for possessing illegal drugs off
campus, can easily be understood as a non-punitive attempt to keep the educa-
tional environment free from drugs and disruptions caused by students who use
drugs.  Thus understood, the expulsion would constitute future regulation of the
educational process rather than punishment of the student for his act of possess-
ing drugs. See supra text and notes 120–29.
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2. Decision Rules and Punishment
While the Packer court mistakenly finds a decision rule unconstitu-
tionally vague, other courts sometimes mistakenly find such rules con-
stitutional when the student violating the rule is punished rather
than dealt with non-punitively.  Thus, in Schmader v. Warren County
School District,266 the court rejected a vagueness claim and upheld a
rule providing that
any student who engages in inappropriate behavior . . . [or] behavior that may
be harmful to others or . . .  other behavior which negatively reflects [on] the
. . . philosophy, goals, and aims of the Warren County School District, will be
subject to . . . disciplinary action.267
An eight-year-old student, Jedidiah, was ordered to spend three fif-
teen-minute sessions in after-school detention after being found in vio-
lation of the rule for failing to inform school officials of a classmate’s
plans to take a plastic throwing dart to school in hopes of injuring
another student.268  Failing to recognize that the rule is clearly a rule
aimed at official decisionmakers and not at students, especially ones
as young as eight years old, the court found it “fundamental to due
process” that the regulation provide fair warning as to the proscribed
conduct “measured by common understanding and practice.”269  The
court concluded that “any eight-year-old child knows or should know”
that he will be in “trouble” at school for failing to report another stu-
dent who intends to inflict harm on other students.270
It strains credulity to assume that an eight-year-old could even
read a rule couched in terms of “behavior,” aimed at action, and glean
from it notice of a risk of being disciplined for inaction, failing to re-
port the threat of a fellow student.  Rather than searching for nonexis-
tent fair warning, the court should have simply declared the rule a
decision rule with no conduct rule component.  As discussed through-
out this Article, such rules are virtually always constitutionally per-
missible so long as punishment is not imposed for their violation.
Thus the issue in Schmader is whether, given that Jedidiah did not
receive fair warning, he received punishment for his inaction.
In response to objections from a dissenting colleague that the impo-
sition of after-school detention constituted “punishment,” thus requir-
ing a clear conduct rule,271 the Schmader majority concluded that the
detention was imposed “not so much to punish” the eight-year-old, but
to “teach him a lesson that he should attempt to prevent harm from
266. 808 A.2d 596 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
267. Id. at 599.
268. Id. at 597–98.
269. Id. at 599.
270. Id. at 600.
271. Id. at 602–03 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
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befalling another human being.”272  Such a conclusion is highly ques-
tionable.  Being required to stay after school was surely aimed at visit-
ing some unpleasantness, a defining characteristic of punishment,273
upon Jedidiah because of his violation of the school rule.  Imposing
such unpleasantness to “teach him a lesson” appears aimed at “spe-
cially deterring” the student274 while perhaps sending a “general de-
terrence” message to the rest of the student body.275  The Schmader
majority saw the detention as simply “more school” aimed at promot-
ing the educational interests of the student rather than at punishing
him,276 but the dissent questioned whether the student received any
additional “education” of any kind during the detention.277  There was
no evidence in the case that any educator spent any time with
Jedidiah during the detention periods teaching him the evils of his
ways.  Rather, the detention appeared simply to be restraint imposed
during a time when the student would normally (and preferably) be
someplace else.  Thus, if in fact he “learned his lesson” through the
detention, it was a consequence of the deterrent effect of being pun-
ished, not the product of “more school.”
Lacking fair warning, the student in Schmader was subjected to
unconstitutional punishment.  While this conclusion may seem a
stretch in light of the arguably de minimis punishment imposed in the
case,278 the principle is not.  Punishment, no matter its form or dura-
tion, is unjustly imposed in the absence of a rule, available at the time
an offender engages in conduct triggering such punishment, which
clearly defines such conduct.279  As the Schmader dissent put it, al-
272. Id. at 600 (majority opinion).
273. See supra notes 121–29 and accompanying text.
274. “Special” or “particular” deterrence is aimed at deterring the offender himself by
giving him an unpleasant experience as a consequence of his offense that he will
not want to endure again. LAFAVE, supra note 29, at 26–27.
275. “General” deterrence aims at deterring others by punishing an offender “lest [the
others] suffer the same unfortunate fate.” Id. at 28.
276. Schmader, 808 A.2d at 600.
277. Id. at 602 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
278. The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a “de minimis level of imposi-
tion” of school punishment which does not interfere with protected liberty inter-
ests of students.  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
Whether the detention in Schmader would so qualify is not clear.  While stu-
dents enjoy minimal liberty interests during school hours, being detained after
school does involve a form of “bodily restraint” arguably constituting infringe-
ment of protected student liberty and thus implicating the fair warning require-
ments of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 673–74.  Clearly, some forms of school
punishment implicate student liberty interests. Id. at 674 (corporal punish-
ment); see Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5, 619 F. Supp. 670, 676–77 (E.D.
Ark. 1985) (rejecting as “subjective” and vague school rules permitting corporal
punishment in an “intense racial atmosphere” for such “offenses” as “put downs,”
“disrespectful behavior” or “caus[ing] unusual circumstances to occur which is
[sic] not covered” by other rules).
279. See supra notes 19, 32 and accompanying text.
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though the punishment in the case was “very minimal,” it neverthe-
less could not be sanctioned where the student “could not reasonably
anticipate” the punitive consequences of his inaction.280
C. Summary
The Supreme Court has recognized that educators possess broad
discretion in carrying out their “custodial,” “tutelary,” and “guardian”
roles.  As is clear from Fraser, the Court has given a constitutional
blessing to educators to make case-by-case judgments in disciplining
and teaching students.  There is no question that the Fraser Court
was much less concerned with whether Matthew Fraser had fair
warning of possible discipline than with allowing the school power to
teach and discipline him.  Nevertheless, the Fraser Court appeared
surprisingly interested in finding a conduct rule in the case.281  I have
argued that no such rule applied, and that Fraser should have been
decided solely in terms of an available decision rule not utilized in the
case.282
Fraser thus represents another example of the recurring failure of
courts deciding vagueness claims to recognize that conduct rules and
fair warning are not necessarily required in every case.  This failure
distorts sound analysis and sometimes, as in Packer, leads to incorrect
constitutional conclusions.  Analytical clarity and simplicity are en-
hanced by recognizing the simple fact that many school disciplinary
rules are in fact decision rules with no conduct rule components, and
such rules are constitutionally permissible so long as their violation
does not entail punitive consequences.  However, as illustrated by
Schmader, courts must be vigilant in assessing whether or not the
consequences of decision rules are in fact punitive.283
Thus, apart from situations where punishment (as opposed to non-
punitive sanctions such as school suspensions or expulsions) is im-
posed, educational policymakers,284 and not courts considering consti-
tutional matters, are left with the question of whether to employ
280. 808 A.2d at 602 n.7 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
281. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 236–44 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 261–77 and accompanying text.
284. Thus, should they so choose, educators embracing “social reproduction” theories
of education are free to enact broad decision rules without concerns that such
rules are unconstitutionally vague for failing to give students fair warning.  On
the other hand, educational policymakers favoring “social reconstruction” theo-
ries empowering students to assert their interests against school authorities may
favor drafting specific conduct rules as a means of protecting student rights.  For
a detailed discussion of these contrasting educational policies as they are mani-
fested in the Supreme Court’s case law, see generally Dupre, supra note 209.
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broad decision rules with no conduct rule component.285  Awareness of
this doctrinal situation should assist the formulation of sound educa-
tional policy while helping the courts to focus on the narrow range of
issues appropriate for judicial consideration.286
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have joined others who have recently attended to
the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules in analyzing
various problem areas of the law.  I have utilized the distinction in
considering vagueness challenges to rules addressed, or thought to be
addressed, solely to young people.  These vagueness challenges raise
unique considerations because the law responds paternalistically to-
wards juveniles who are in many ways deemed not to be full-fledged
constitutional persons.
As I have discussed, the vagueness challenges arise in the contexts
of statutes defining status offense jurisdiction of juvenile courts and
rules aimed at maintaining discipline in schools.  In describing the
conduct rule/decision rule distinction as it relates to the void for
vagueness doctrine, I identified several concepts derived from Su-
preme Court case law and the scholarly literature, particularly the
concept that conduct rules are constitutionally necessary only if pun-
ishment is imposed.  As illustrated in Parts III and IV, the courts con-
sistently misunderstand this concept and instead assume that conduct
rules and fair warnings are necessary to avoid unconstitutional vague-
285. Of course, in rare cases school officials might arbitrarily apply a decision rule or
impose it in a discriminatory fashion.  In such instances, the vagueness doctrine
would render such abuses of discretion unconstitutional. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
286. Judicial recognition of the arguments presented in this Article would remove in-
centives for students to litigate vagueness claims against disciplinary rules that
are exclusively decision rules.  Absent a serious claim of arbitrary or discrimina-
tory application or imposition of punitive sanctions, students lack standing to
raise vagueness attacks.  Not only would this free the courts from hearing cases
like Packer and those described in note 247 supra, where the courts mistakenly
found unconstitutional vagueness, but it would also free courts from hearing
cases where the courts needlessly expend resources upholding decision rules
against vagueness attacks.  For example, in Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of the City of
Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992), the court upheld a rule stating that “a
student does not have a right to engage in conduct that will cause a disruption,
disturb, or interrupt any school activity.” Id. at 1529.  School officials suspended
a student for violating the rule after the student wore a shirt to school with the
words “drugs suck” printed thereon. Id. at 1528.  Concluding that the shirt em-
bodied an offensive sexual message that risked disruption of the school environ-
ment, the officials so informed the student and her father and asked her to
change into another shirt. Id. at 1529.  After both the student and her father
refused, the officials suspended the student, arguing that the rule supplied her
adequate notice. Id. at 1530.  The court concluded simply that the claim had “no
merit.” Id. at 1532.
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ness.  This misunderstanding has two manifestations.  Sometimes it
merely clouds the analysis of courts, which nevertheless decide their
cases correctly; but at other times the courts’ misguided insistence on
a conduct rule leads them to the incorrect conclusion that a rule is
vague for want of a conduct rule, when in fact the extant decision rule
is itself constitutionally sufficient.
When courts engage in misguided searches for unnecessary con-
duct rules, they fail to see that the constitutional issue is a narrow
one: Is the decision rule by itself constitutional?  I have shown also
that courts sometimes make the opposite mistake of assuming a more
narrow constitutional issue than actually exists by failing to address
the issue of whether or not punishment is imposed under a decision
rule with no conduct rule component.
Understanding the relationship between conduct rules and deci-
sion rules is essential to resolving the constitutional issues involved in
vagueness attacks on statutes addressed to juveniles.  Such under-
standing is not only crucial to courts in deciding vagueness cases, but
it is also critical to policymakers in deciding whether and when to rely
exclusively on open-ended decision rules to achieve their policy objec-
tives.  Broad decision rules are often deemed especially useful in pro-
moting the welfare of young people, whether through person-oriented
status condition rules in juvenile court or through broad standards
permitting case-by-case opportunities to teach and discipline school
students.  Understanding the scope of the vagueness doctrine thus
permits policymakers to make decisions that are not only constitution-
ally permissible, but are also more likely to be good for young people.
